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. . . we always have had a great
deal of difficulty in understanding
the world view that quantum
mechanics represents. At least I
do, because I’m an old enough
man that I haven’t got to the point
that this stuff is obvious to me.
Okay, I still get nervous with it.
And therefore, some of the
younger students. . . you know
how it always is, every new idea,
it takes a generation or two until it
becomes obvious that there’s no
real problem. It has not yet
become obvious to me that there’s
no real problem. I cannot define
the real problem, therefore I
suspect there’s no real problem,
but I’m not sure there’s no real
problem.
Richard Feynman
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Abstract
In this thesis we explore the questions of what should be considered a “classical” theory, and
which aspects of quantum theory cannot be captured by any theory that respects our intuition
of classicality.
This exploration is divided in two parts: in the first we review classical results of the
literature, such as the Kochen-Specker theorem, von Neumann’s theorem, Gleason’s theorem,
as well as more recent ideas, such as the distinction between ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic ontological
models, Spekkens’ definition of contextuality, Hardy’s ontological excess baggage theorem and
the PBR theorem.
The second part is concerned with pinning down what should be the “correct” definition of
contextuality. We settle down on the definition advocated by Abramsky and Branderburger,
motivated by the Fine theorem, and show the connection of this definition with the work of
George Boole. This definition allows us to unify the notions of locality and noncontextuality,
and use largely the same tools to characterize how quantum mechanics violates these notions
of classicality. Exploring this formalism, we find a new family of noncontextuality inequalities.
We conclude by reviewing the notion of state-independent contextuality.
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Introduction
Quantum mechanics is magic.
Daniel Greenberger
This thesis is meant to explore the question posed by Chris Fuchs: what is “Zing!” [1]?
What is the property of quantum mechanics which is essentially quantum, absent from any
classical theory? Contrary to the goals of Chris Fuchs, our exploration is operationalist rather
than axiomatic: our “Zing!” is not a deep axiom that reveals the essence of quantum theory,
but rather logically connected sets of probability distributions that cannot be reproduced by
any classical theory. Although finding his axiom would be nice, we feel that our approach is
more useful, as these sets of probability distributions are the resources needed for quantum
magic: quantum computing and quantum key distribution.
This is emphatically not a historical account of the subject: these are plentiful, and another
one is unnecessary. Therefore, we shall try to keep references to the great works of von
Neumann, Bell, Kochen, and Specker to a bare minimum, while emphasising the newer2 works
of Abramsky, Busch, Cabello, Hardy, Pitowsky, and Spekkens. The sole exception shall be the
work of George Boole, that although very old is still very unknown.
Given a general picture of my motivations and goals, let me now give a more detailed
account of the structure of this thesis.
Chapter 1 presents introductory material3 on the question “is quantum mechanics really
different from ‘classical’ theories?”. It begins by capturing some notions of classicality within
the framework of ontological theories; then this question is made more precise as “is there an
ontological embedding of quantum theory?”.
The chapter proceeds by detailing specific ontological models, and showing which problems
arise in trying to reproduce the results of quantum mechanics within them. These problems
are then understood as their failure to respect noncontextuality, a notion that we argue to be
fundamental in defining classicality. After giving a precise definition of noncontextuality, we
proceed to prove Spekkens’ theorem of the impossibility of embedding quantum theory within
a preparation noncontextual ontological model.
We proceed then to revisit our assumptions, and try to find whether a less ambitious notion
of classicality can embed quantum theory. To do that, we revisit the historical theorems of
von Neumann and Gleason, culminating with the recent version of Busch. In each of their
frameworks, a “classical” formulation of quantum mechanics is again ruled out.
The next stop is the famous theorem of Kochen and Specker, that uses the weakest assump-
tions yet. We present three recent versions of it, by Cabello et al., Yu and Oh, and Peres and
Mermin, that are considerable simplifications of the original proof.
2As a result, the median year of publishing of our references is 2002.
3The reader that is already well-acquainted with the subject (or a mathematician) may find it better to skip it.
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The chapter concludes by presenting a recent theorem of Hardy, that “any ontological
embedding of quantum theory is very uncomfortable”, and two specific contextual ontological
embeddings of quantum theory.
Our conclusion is then that any reasonable ontological embedding of quantum theory is
impossible; therefore there is something more in quantum mechanics that classical theories
cannot quite capture. Chapter 2 is then dedicated to detail what this something is.
We begin by constructing our final definition of noncontextuality. Based on the recent
work of Abramsky and Brandenburger, we show that the Fine theorem admits a natural
generalization that applies to any set of observables, without regard to spatial separation.
This generalization in its turn motivates a definition of noncontextuality that is a natural
generalization of the definition of locality, with mostly the same mathematical structure – this
allows us to consider generalizations of Bell inequalities that test noncontextuality instead of
locality. Interestingly, this “new” definition was already implicit in the ancient works of Boole
(and in the more recent works by Pitowsky), which motivates us to call these generalized Bell
inequalities Boole inequalities.
This “new” approach is then formalized via a classical problem in mathematics, the marginal
problem. Using its formalism, we gain access to powerful tools to separate contextual from
noncontextual probability distributions, and with them derive a new result: a set of Boole
inequalities that completely describes an infinite family of noncontextual polytopes.
Notation and definitions
The purpose of this part of the thesis is only to establish notation, not to teach quantum
mechanics to anyone. If one needs such an introduction, we recommend the excellent book of
Michael Nielsen and Isaac Chuang [2].
We say that an operator A is self-adjoint, i.e., A = A∗, if 〈φ|Aψ〉 = 〈Aφ|ψ〉 = 〈φ|A|ψ〉 for
all |φ〉, |ψ〉. We shall only deal with finite-dimensional operators. The set of all self-ajoint
operators is O(H).
A quantum-mechanical observable is a self-adjoint operator.
We say that an operator A is positive, i.e., A ≥ 0, if 〈ψ|A|ψ〉 ≥ 0 for all |ψ〉.
A quantum state ρ is a positive operator such that 0 ≤ tr ρ ≤ 1 [3]. Since we shall have no
use for states such that tr ρ < 1, we can omit the normalization of our quantum states without
ambiguity. The set of all quantum states is D(H). A pure quantum state is an extremal point
of D(H), a rank-one projector ψ. The vector of a pure quantum state will be denoted by |ψ〉,
and the vectors are connected to the projectors by
ψ = |ψ〉〈ψ|.
The set of all pure states is PH.
An effect E is a positive operator smaller than identity, i.e., 0 ≤ E ≤ 1. The set of all effects
is E(H). A set of effects {Ei} such that ∑i Ei = 1 describes a measurement4 and is called a
POVM.
A projector Π is a self-adjoint operator such that Π2 = Π. The set of all projectors is P(H).
A set of projectors {Πi} such that ∑i Πi = 1 describes a measurement and is called a PVM.
Note that a PVM is a special case of a POVM.
The Born rule is the quantum mechanical rule for associating measurement probabilities
with states and effects. We say that
p(i|ρ, E) = tr ρEi.
4Except for the post-measurement state.
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Chapter 1
Ontological embeddings of quantum
theory
Classical measurements reveal information.
Quantum measurements produce information.
Marcelo Terra Cunha
The quest for embedding quantum mechanics in a “classical” theory is almost as old as
quantum theory itself. People were disturbed with the role of measurement in the theory,
particularly with its intrinsic randomness and non-repeatability. So they tried to explain away
these features as emergent, rather than fundamental, as if they appeared because of a lack of
control and understanding of a more refined theory, that would describe the “deeper” physics
behind quantum phenomena. We call this refined theory an ontological theory.
But despite being familiar, the words “classical” and “ontological” have very fuzzy meanings.
In the next section we shall pin them down and clarify them.
1.1 What is an ontological theory?
The first ontological models that appeared tried to “solve” the problem of non-determinism.
They postulated that ψ was not the real state of nature, but rather some kind of shadow of it. So
they postulated that there was a real state, an ontic state1, called λ, that if known would render
all measurement outcomes deterministic. That is, given a PVM2 M = {Mk}, the probability of
outcome k given λ would be either 0 or 1, that is, we can define a response function
ξk|M : Λ→ {0, 1},
such that ξk|M(λ) is the probability of outcome k. Here, Λ is any space in which our ontic
states λ are defined, and to account for the fact that ∑k Mk = 1, we require that ∑k ξk|M(λ) = 1
for all λ. This is just the requirement that some outcome must occur in a measurement.
Then the subjective indeterminism of quantum theory would be recovered by the ignorance
of which ontic states were really present in a experiment. That is, a quantum state ψ would
1The reader that is well-acquainted with the subject might be wondering when the expression “hidden-variable”
will appear. Well, it won’t.
2Even the most determined determinist can’t hope for a POVM to be deterministic. We’ll explain why in a while.
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determine a probability distribution µψ(λ) over Λ. This property can be thought of as “you
were trying to generate state ψ, but you ended up generating an ensemble of ontic states
µψ(λ)”. As in quantum (and classical) mechanics, we shall call the ensemble µψ(λ) itself a
state, while reserving the term pure ontic state for the individual λ, which can of course be
represented as an ensemble with a δ distribution.
Of course, we want this subjective indeterminism to agree with the predictions of quantum
mechanics, so
p(k|ψ, M) =
∫
Λ
dλ µψ(λ)ξk|M(λ) = trψMk. (1.1)
1.1.1 On mixed states and POVMs
The early literature of ontological theories did not do this separation between states and
measurements3 [4, 5]; instead they tried to define a deterministic value function v(Mk,ψ,λ)
that would answer with certainty the outcome of an experiment, given the quantum state
and the ontic state, and recover the quantum statistics by averaging over λ. This is quite
problematic, since it can only describe models in which ψ itself has an ontic status4; it therefore
can never describe experiments where the quantum state is explicitly epistemic, e.g., a mixed
state. For instance, let’s say we have two pure states ψ and φ with different deterministic
outcomes v(Mk,ψ,λ) and v(Mk, φ,λ). Then if I prepare state ψ with probability p or state φ
with probability (1− p), corresponding to the mixed state ρ = pψ+ (1− p)φ, the outcome
must be
v(Mk, ρ,λ) = pv(Mk,ψ,λ) + (1− p)v(Mk, φ,λ),
which is neither 0 nor 1 for non-trivial p, a contradiction.
Using probability distributions like we do, this can be accommodated in a very natural
manner:
Lemma 1. If one prepares the quantum states ψi with probabilities pi, then the corresponding ontic
state is
µ(pi ,ψi)(λ) =∑
i
piµψi (λ)
Proof. Quantum mechanics tells us that p(k|(pi,ψi), M) = ∑i pi p(k|ψi, M). Writing these
probabilities ontologically, we have5∫
Λ
µ(pi ,ψi)ξk|M =∑
i
pi
∫
Λ
µψiξk|M.
Since ξk|M is positive and arbitrary, this implies that
µ(pi ,ψi)(λ) =∑
i
piµψi (λ).
Note that this same rule is used to describe convex combinations of states in quantum and
classical mechanics.
3With the honourable exception of the Kochen-Specker model, discussed in section 1.3.1.
4See section 1.3 for further discussion of this point.
5When doing calculations we shall often omit the integration variable λ, but only when there’s no risk of ambiguity.
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The issue with POVMs is similar: one can implement the POVM
E = {p|0〉〈0|, p|1〉〈1|, (1− p)|+〉〈+|, (1− p)|−〉〈−|}
simply by measuring the PVM M = {|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|} with probability p and the PVM N =
{|+〉〈+|, |−〉〈−|} with probability 1− p [6]; we must have then ξ0|E(λ) = pξ0|M(λ), which is
obviously not deterministic. We must accept, then, that for these kinds of “mixed” POVMs6
the response functions must be modified to
ξk|E : Λ→ [0, 1],
that is, allowing the whole interval [0, 1] as image.
For “pure” POVMs, this argument does not apply, and we can not decide a priori whether
to demand them to be deterministic. In fact, it is fruitful to allow even PVMs to be objectively
non-deterministic7, so we shall not exclude this possibility.
The most general case is, therefore,
p(k|ρ, E) =
∫
Λ
dλµρ(λ)ξk|E(λ) = tr ρEk, (1.2)
and this is what an ontological theory should strive to reproduce, only falling back to pure
states and PVMs when unavoidable.
1.2 Ontological models
With the definitions given in the previous section, it is already possible to construct some
examples of ontological theories, to examine their features in a more concrete manner.
1.2.1 The naïve ontology
If we allow an ontological model to have objective non-determinism, what we gain in relation
to quantum mechanics? Not much, actually. This ontological model is so similar to quantum
mechanics that it can be confounded with a naïve interpretation of it, that ascribes ontological
status to the pure states. Nevertheless, it is quite useful to examine meticulously this ontological
model, to be aware of the problems that such a naïve interpretation has. This particular model
was first proposed by [7], and further explored in [8].
In this model, we are considering the pure states ψ to be the ontic states λ, so we identify
the ontic state space Λ with PH, and define
µψ(λ) = δ(λ− ψ).
The response function is then
ξk|E(λ) = trλEk,
and we recover the results of quantum mechanics by
p(k|ψ, E) =
∫
Λ
dλ δ(λ− ψ) trλEk = trψEk.
6Following [6], we are calling “mixed” the POVMs that can be written as a convex combination of different POVMs,
and “pure” those who can’t.
7However discomforting that may seem for some people, it’s certainly a milder discomfort than abandoning the
notion of reality altogether as in quantum mechanics. See section 1.2.1.
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We can see, then, that mathematically this ontological model is quite trivial. One interesting
thing to examine, though, is the representation of mixed states in this formalism. Following
lemma 1, we see that
ρ =∑
i
piψi 7→ µρ(λ) =∑
i
piδ(λ− ψi),
which trivially reproduces the required quantum statistics. The problem with this approach,
however, is that the ontic state µρ(λ) depends on which convex decomposition of ρ we chose
to use. This makes the the notation µρ suspect, since it should actually be µ(pi ,ψi), and blatantly
violates the C∗-algebraic definition of state [9], that requires that states that gives rises to the
same statistics to have the same mathematical representation. We call this (unwanted) feature
preparation contextuality, which we shall define more carefully in section 1.4.
Remember that it is common for beginners to be surprised by the fact that it is impossible
to know which convex combination was actually used to construct a given density matrix.
Regarding the pure states as ontological, this feeling becomes quite natural, since the mystery is
why should the state µ(pi ,ψi) give the same statistics as the state µ(qi ,φi) when ∑i piψi = ∑i qiφi.
To solve this problem, one might be tempted to ignore common sense (and lemma 1) and
ascribe ontological status to mixed states, identifying Λ with D(H) instead of PH; then the
ontic states would be just
µρ(λ) = δ(λ− ρ),
relieving us of the basis-dependence. But this is in fact a terrible idea, since one can always
write a mixed state ρ as a convex combination of two different states σ0 and σ1, as
ρ = pσ0 + (1− p)σ1.
If you want to regard every mixed state as ontological, you have, by lemma 1,
δ(λ− ρ) = pδ(λ− σ0) + (1− p)δ(λ− σ1),
a flat-out contradiction.
One can now begin to suspect that it is not possible to avoid preparation contextuality;
this will be proved in section 1.5. For now, we see that even the most humble ontological
model, that does not even provide determinism, already has some very undesirable features. It
would be a question then if a deterministic ontological model is even possible; fortunately this
question was answered a long time ago in the positive. We shall see how in the next subsection.
1.2.2 Constructing a deterministic ontological model
In 1964, Bell had an idea on how to make a deterministic ontological model [4]: hide the
quantum mechanical probability of an outcome in the measure of the set of ontic states
associated to that outcome. I shall present here a modified version of his model that makes
this point quite clear.
This model can describe in a deterministic way the measurement of a one-qubit PVM
Π = {Π0,Π1}. The ontic space is Λ = PH× [0, 1], with ontic variable λ = (λψ,λx). The ontic
state of a given quantum state ψ is
µψ(λψ,λx) = δ(λψ − ψ),
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and the response functions8 are
ξ0|Π(λψ,λx) = Θ(trλψΠ0 − λx)
ξ1|Π(λψ,λx) = 1− ξ0|Π(λψ,λx),
where Θ is the Heaviside step function defined by
Θ(x) =
{
1 if x ≥ 0,
0 if x < 0.
One then recovers quantum statistics by uniform averaging over the ontic space:
p(0|ψ,Π) =
∫
Λ
µψξ0|Π
=
∫
Λ
dλψ dλx δ(λψ − ψ)Θ(trλψΠ0 − λx)
=
∫ 1
0
dλx Θ(trψΠ0 − λx)
=
∫ trψΠ0
0
dλx = trψΠ0
The reader might have noticed that although the model claims to only work for a qubit, the
mathematical formalism does not make any reference to this, and one might be tempted to
think that it actually works for any two-outcome PVM. The fact that it does not work is more
subtle, and we shall see why in section 1.7.
1.3 ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic models
Both models presented in the previous section share a common feature: the quantum state has
an ontological status. Either the ontic state is the quantum state itself, like in the naïve model,
or it is the quantum state supplemented by real number in the unit interval, as in the Bell
model. In both cases, knowing the (pure) ontic state λ of the system is enough to determine
uniquely the (pure) quantum state that was prepared. These kind of models are called9 ψ-ontic,
and have the equivalent but more operational definition:
Definition 2. An ontological model is ψ-ontic if for different quantum states φ and ψ the ontic states
have disjoint support, i.e.,
φ 6= ψ ⇒ µφ(λ)µψ(λ) = 0 ∀λ
To motivate this definition it might be useful to make an analogy with classical mechanics:
in it, an ontic state is a point in phase space, and ontic properties of it (like energy, momentum)
are functions of the phase space point. Likewise, anything that is uniquely determined by the
ontic state in an ontological theory should be regarded as ontic itself, as a change in it requires
a change of the underlying ontic states. As the quantum state is uniquely determined by the
ontic state in ψ-ontic models, it has to be regarded as ontic, as it is not possible to change it
without changing the underlying ontic states.
8Note that the response functions depend explicitly on the label of the projectors, so it would be desirable to set a
consistent ordering convention to avoid giving different results to {|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|} and {|1〉〈1|, |0〉〈0|}.
9The concept of ontic and epistemic states was first introduced in [10], and further formalized in [8, 11]. A nice
discussion of these concepts can be found in [12].
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Apart from conceptual clarity, a reason to make this definition is that it is easy to see that
ψ-ontic models necessarily require instant transfer of information10. In the first case, where
ψ is the whole ontic state, it suffices to consider a measurement in an entangled state: Alice
and Bob share |φ+〉 = |00〉+ |11〉 and are spatially separated, Alice then measures the PVM
{|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|} and obtains, e.g., the result 0. Bob’s state then changes instantly from 1 to |0〉,
violating causality. Of course, if ψ is not the whole ontic state, there is no need for a violation
of causality: λ can tell us that the state of Bob’s system actually was |0〉 all along, and so the
ontic state does not change during the measurement.
To deal with this case, we need the epr gedankenexperiment11 [13]: consider that Alice can
also measure the PVM {|+〉〈+|, |−〉〈−|}; then after her measurement Bob’s state will belong
to the set {|0〉, |1〉} if she measures the first PVM, or to the set {|+〉, |−〉} if Alice measures
the second PVM. Even if the results of any given measurement can be predetermined by λ, it
cannot tell which measurement was made12. Since Bob’s quantum state does depend on which
measurement was made (since the four possibilities are different), the formalism needs again
instant transfer of information.
Another way to avoid the violation of causality is to say that ψ is not ontic, but merely the
representation of Alice’s knowledge of reality, i.e., epistemic. Then what changed after the
measurement was actually just what Alice knew about Bob’s state, which is in fact a quite
reasonable proposition. But this amounts to give up ψ-ontic models in favour of ψ-epistemic
ones13:
Definition 3. An ontological model is ψ-epistemic if it is not ψ-ontic.
Again, an analogy with classical mechanics might be useful: the classical mixed state is a
probability distribution over the phase space, and it is interpreted as epistemic, as it is merely
an ignorance about which is the real phase space point that the system occupies. This is only
possible as there is no restriction about the overlaps of different mixed states, i.e., the same
phase space point can belong to numerous different mixed states. Notice that this definition is
quite weak compared to the classical case: it only requires that there is one pair φ, ψ whose
ontic states µφ and µψ share a single λ in their support.
The obvious question to ask: is there a ψ-epistemic model?
1.3.1 The Kochen-Specker model
Even before this question was raised, it was already answered by Simon Kochen and Ernst
Specker [14], by the ontological model they constructed as a counterexample to von Neumann’s
theorem [15]. It seems that the authors were trying to make a model that was somewhat
physically plausible, and ended up making a ψ-epistemic model. We presented it here as
rendered in [8].
The ontic space Λ is the unit sphere S2, and we shall use the Bloch vectors ψˆ and φˆ
to represent a pure state ψ and a measurement projector φ in S2 as well, defined via the
10Only in the formalism, of course; if they displayed an observable violation of causality that would be a contradic-
tion with quantum mechanics.
11The version presented here is Einstein’s version, reproduced in [8].
12Indeed, it could conceivably determine which measurement Alice will make – here we are using the assumption
that she has free will.
13It is interesting to notice that although we’ve known this since 1935, the first ontological models were all ψ-ontic.
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isomorphism ψ = 12 (1+ ψˆ · σ). The ontic state is then
µψ(λ) =
1
pi
Θ(ψˆ · λ)ψˆ · λ,
making the model clearly ψ-epistemic, since the only states that do not overlap are orthogonal
states. The response function is given by
ξφ(λ) = Θ(φˆ · λ).
To recover the quantum statistics, notice that each of µψ and ξφ has as support an hemisphere
centred in ψˆ and φˆ, so their intersection defines a spherical lune. To take advantage of this,
let’s choose coordinates such that ψˆ and φˆ lie in the equator of S2, so that ψˆ = (cosψ, sinψ, 0),
φˆ = (cos φ, sin φ, 0), and λ = (sin θ cos ϕ, sin θ sin ϕ, cos θ). We have then
p(φ|ψ) =
∫
Λ
dλ
1
pi
Θ(ψˆ · λ)ψˆ · λΘ(φˆ · λ)
=
1
pi
∫
S2
dΩΘ(sin θ cos(ϕ− ψ)) sin θ cos(ϕ− ψ)Θ(sin θ cos(ϕ− φ))
=
1
pi
∫ pi
0
dθ sin2 θ
∫ 2pi
0
dϕΘ(cos(ϕ− ψ)) cos(ϕ− ψ)Θ(cos(ϕ− φ))
=
1
2
∫ ψ+ pi2
φ− pi2
dϕ cos(ϕ− ψ)
=
1
2
(1− sin(φ− ψ− pi/2))
=
1
2
(1+ cos(φ− ψ))
= trψφ.
This model does seem to be the most “natural” of the ontological models yet considered,
and there have even been attempts to understand it physically [16]. In this same article,
Terry Rudolph explores extensions of the Kochen-Specker model to higher dimensions, but
fails to precisely reproduce quantum mechanics with them. A ψ-epistemic model for higher
dimensions has since then been found (we discuss it in section 1.9.2), but it does not have the
simplicity of the Kochen-Specker model, and so it would be unfair to call it an extension of it.
1.3.2 Two theorems on ψ-epistemic models
We can see, then, that ψ-epistemic models are desirable and can actually be constructed. There
are, however, two theorems that say that any such model, if it exists, has to be very unnatural.
They are both based on the following idea:
Lemma 4. If there are quantum states ψi and measurements Ei such that trψiEi = 0 ∀i, then there
can be no λ0 in the support of all µψi .
Proof. If these conditions are satisfied, then it must be true that∫
Λ
dλ µψi (λ)ξi|E(λ) = 0,
and therefore that ξi|E(λ) = 0 for all λ in the support of µψi . If there is a λ0 in the support of all
the µψi , making the model ψ-epistemic, then ∑i ξi|E(λ0) = 0, an absurd, since in the definition
of the response functions we require that ∑i ξi|E(λ) = 1 for all λ.
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Of course, if we could prove that for any pair of states the hypothesis of the lemma are
satisfied, we would have proven that no ψ-epistemic model is possible; but for a pair of states
the hypothesis of the lemma are satisfied only if they are orthogonal, and by lemma 13 they
must have disjoint support anyway:
Lemma 5. If there are quantum states ψ0,ψ1 and measurements E, 1− E such that trψ0E = trψ1(1−
E) = 0, then ψ0ψ1 = 0
Proof. trψ1(1− E) = 0 ⇒ trψ1E = 1, so the support of ψ1 is contained in the support of E.
But trψ0E = 0 implies that the supports of ψ0 and E are disjoint, and therefore the supports of
ψ0 and ψ1 are disjoint, so ψ0ψ1 = 0
Instead, the two theorems we shall present consider larger families: the first considers
families of three states to show that there are non-trivial examples, and the second argues
that the existence of some specific families implies that any ψ-epistemic model must be very
unnatural.
Theorem 6 (Caves, Fuchs, Shack [17]). If the convex hull of a family of states ψi contains 1/d, where
d is the Hilbert space dimension, then there can be no λ0 in the common support of all µψi .
Proof. For any state ψi, it is true that trψi(1− ψi) = 0. If we can find coefficients αi such that
{αi(1− ψi)} is a POVM, then lemma 4 applies and we’re done. What we need is
∑
i
αi(1− ψi) = 1,
for αi ≥ 0. Taking the trace on both sides we get that ∑i αi = dd−1 . Simple algebra then shows
us that
∑
i
d− 1
d
αiψi =
1
d
1.
This theorem was first proven in [17], with a different objective. While it does not exclude
ψ-epistemic models, it shows there are a wide variety of families of states that can’t have an
overlap. If the number of states is three, there are already examples in any dimension where
they are not orthogonal; see equations (1.6) for an example.
The next theorem needs the following (very natural, in the author’s opinion) assumption
about the composition of different systems:
Assumption 1. If two quantum states φ and ψ are prepared independently, such that their joint state
is φ⊗ ψ, then the corresponding ontic state for the joint system is µφ⊗ψ(λA,λB) = µφ(λA)µψ(λB).
Theorem 7 (Pusey, Barret, Rudolph [18]). Given assumption 1, no ψ-epistemic ontological model of
quantum mechanics is possible.
Proof. Consider the four quantum states φ0 ⊗ φ0, φ0 ⊗ φ1, φ1 ⊗ φ0, and φ1 ⊗ φ1. If there is a λ0
in the support of µφ0 and µφ1 , then (λ0,λ0) is in the support of all four µφi (λ
′)µφj(λ′′). If there
is a POVM
{
Eij
}
such that tr φi ⊗ φjEij = 0, then lemma 4 applies and we’re done.
Consider now the particular case |φ0〉 = |0〉 and |φ1〉 = |+〉. Then if Eij is the projector onto∣∣Eij〉 = |φiφ⊥j 〉+ ∣∣φ⊥i φj〉, it is easy to see that
tr φi ⊗ φjEij =
〈
φiφj
∣∣Eij〉 = 0,
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and it is also easy (but tedious) to check that ∑ij Eij = 1. Unfortunately, this simple strategy
only works for this pair of states, and states with smaller overlap require measurements on a
larger number of parts. For the proof of the general case, see the original article14 [18].
This theorem has two immediate corollaries:
Corollary 8. Any ontological model of quantum mechanics must violate causality.
One only has to notice that since the theorem excludes ψ-epistemic models, we’re left with
ψ-ontic ones. And we have shown that those violate causality in the beginning of this section.
Corollary 9. The ontic state space Λ is uncountable.
In a ψ-ontic model there is an injection of P(H) onto Λ. Since P(H) is uncountable, Λ
must be uncountable. In fact, even if without assumption 1 we can still prove that Λ is infinite;
we shall do this in section 1.8.
The obvious question that this theorem raises is: can we do away with assumption 1 and
prove once and for all that ψ-epistemic models are always impossible? The existence of the
Kochen-Specker model already hints that at least some weaker assumption is needed, since it
is a bona fide ψ-epistemic model. Of course, its existence does not contradict the theorem, since
it only forbids models for dimension 4 or greater. In fact, soon after the Pusey-Barret-Rudolph
was published, some of the same authors showed that without assumption 1 they could make
a ψ-epistemic model for a quantum system of any dimension. We shall describe this model in
section 1.9.2.
This theorem already hints of a theme that shall be recurrent in the search for ontological
models: we can in fact make ontological models for quantum theory, and in fact we can make
them almost in any way that we like, but there’s a price to pay: the various aspects of the model
become more and more intertwined. We can’t really talk of independent quantum systems,
separation between state and experiment, nor even (as we shall see in the next section) talk
about a measurement outcome without talking about the whole experiment. Of course, this
bodes very badly for the idea of ontological models: in the extreme limit of this interdependence
our ontological model only lists possible experiments and their results, without ever trying
to make sense of them in a simpler and more general theory. A model like this wouldn’t be
falsifiable by its very nature, but precisely because of this it is a perversion of the scientific
method [19], and should therefore be rejected on methodological grounds.
What we seek, therefore, is not any ontological model, but one that might have some
plausibleness. The ontological models present hitherto are of course very contrived, but by
themselves they should not be taken as an evidence against the possibility of a reasonable
ontological model, since they were conceived only as proofs of principle, without any inspiration
from physical grounds.
1.4 Contextuality
One should contrast the state of research into contextuality to the state of research into
nonlocality. It is quite clear that nonlocality has a better status: it was subjected to experimental
14This proof uses the notation from [12], which is clearer than the one in the original article.
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tests much earlier15, and also had its potential as a resource for practical applications recognized
much earlier16
This state of affairs has many causes, which certainly includes the intuitive appeal of
nonlocality via its relation with relativity, but I’d like to focus in a more formal one: the
definitions of nonlocality and contextuality. Right in the first paper about nonlocality, John
Bell [24] already gave a clear operational definition of nonlocality, that was not dependent on
quantum theory, but instead only on a general probabilistic framework. By contrast, the first
definition of contextuality, also due to John Bell17, was very specific to quantum theory, and
was not at all operational:
Definition 10 (Bell’s contextuality). We say that an ontological model for quantum theory is noncon-
textual if the response function associated to the outcome k of a PVM M = {Πk}, i.e., ξk|M(λ) depends
only on Πk and not on the whole M.
This definition also lacks conceptual clarity: John Bell even thought that it was reasonable
for a physical theory to be contextual [4]:
The result of an observation may reasonably depend not only on the state of the
system (including hidden variable) but also on the complete disposition of the
apparatus.
But one consequence of contextuality is precisely the violation of causality that he abhorred:
consider, for instance, the PVM
M = {Π0 ⊗ 1,Π1 ⊗ 1, 1⊗Π0, 1⊗Π1}.
If the real result ξ0|M(λ), associated with the projector Π0 ⊗ 1, depends on whether the other
side of the PVM is 1⊗Π0, 1⊗Π1 or 1⊗Π′0, 1⊗Π′1, then the apparatuses must always be
able to communicate their arrangement to each other, even when the choice of arrangement is
made with a space-like separation, which is of course absurd. This settles the question about
ontological models of independent quantum systems. But what about single systems? Is there
any unacceptable consequence of contextuality for them?
Yes! It also implies on a violation of causality. As put by Asher Peres and Amiran Ron [26]:
More generally, if [A, B] = [A, C] = 0 but [B, C] 6= 0, suppose that we measure A
first and only a later time decide whether to measure B or C or none of them. How
can the outcome of the measurement A depend on this future decision?
Furthermore, this whole story about communicating apparatuses is quite queer, even when
it is not a violation of causality. After all, all the evidence we have is that the measurement
of commuting observables does not affect each other, and an ontological theory that requires
this kind of communication would be very weird indeed. Another problem is that this
communication could affect only the individual measurements ξi|M(λ), and must never be
detectable in the quantum experiments we do. To postulate this kind of “cryptocontextuality”18
seems very unscientific: we would be making a theory which is about precisely what we can’t
measure.
151972 [20], in contrast with 2000 [21].
161991 [22], versus 2000 [23].
17The concept appeared first in 1966 [4], in a critique of the Gleason theorem, whereas the name “contextuality”
was created in 1978 [25], by Clauser and Shimony.
18With apologies to Asher Peres.
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Another way to think about the weirdness of a contextual model is operationally: imagine
that you are an experimentalist that has implemented an apparatus that can differentiate
between the ground state and the excited states of a many-level atom. You try it hard, repeat
your experiment a lot of times, with different input states, gather the statistics, and is confident
that your apparatus is quite trustworthy; you now want to teach a friend experimentalist how
to build a similar apparatus. Quite simple, isn’t it? You just tell him how you did, ask him
to gather statistics, and compare with yours: if the statistics match, you’ve implemented the
same experiment. Except it isn’t so if your physical theory is contextual: the statistics of the
projector Π0 (the projector onto the ground state) are not enough to determine the results of
the experiment, since according to definition 10 the real results ξ0|Π(λ) depend on the rest
of the (unmeasured) projectors; and these are not only the higher energy levels of the atom,
but can in principle include any environmental data, such as the apparatus’ mass, the local
weather, whether Virgo is ascendant. . .
In this way, we are rendered incapable of comparing experiments and establishing patterns,
the very foundation of our scientific method. Notice the strong parallel between this discussion
and the definitions of state and observable in the C∗-algebraic axiomatization done by Franco
Strocchi [9]. This motivates a new definition of contextuality, due to Spekkens [11], that takes
into account these arguments:
A noncontextual ontological model of an operational theory is one wherein if two
experimental procedures are operationally equivalent, then they have equivalent
representations in the ontological model.
Within this reasoning, it becomes sufficient to have equivalent statistics to be able to identify
different experiments, and we are able again to do science. But a definition that uses only
words is quite imprecise, and we should codify it in order to avoid misinterpretations:
Definition 11 (Spekkens’ contextuality). Let p(k|P, M) be the probability of obtaining the outcome
k when doing the measurement M on a state prepared via procedure P. Then we say that an ontological
model of an operational theory is measurement noncontextual if
p(k|P, M) = p(k|P, M′) ∀P ⇒ M = M′. (1.3)
Analogously, we say that an ontological model of an operational theory is preparation noncontextual if
p(k|P, M) = p(k|P′, M) ∀M ⇒ P = P′. (1.4)
The central idea is simple: if measurements M and M′ give the same statistics for every
preparation procedure P, then we must say that they are in fact the same measurement, with
equivalent mathematical representation, and if preparation procedures P and P′ give the same
statistics for every measurement M, then we must say that they are in fact the same preparation
procedure, with equivalent mathematical representation.
Note that this definition improves on Bell’s definition by removing any explicit reference to
quantum theory, talking about only an “operational theory”, i.e., a theory in which we can talk
about preparation procedures, measurements, and probabilities. However, this is still not the
definition we’re looking for. We want to be able to say whether a given probability distribution
is contextual or not, as we do with the definition of nonlocality. This we shall do in the next
chapter; for this one, this definition is good enough.
We want to specialize this definition to ontological models of quantum theory, as a matter of
convenience, since that’s all we’ll be talking about. Note that in quantum theory p(k|P, M) =
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tr ρMk is completely defined by the measurement operator Mk and the quantum state ρ, so
that’s all our ontological model can take into account. More precisely
Definition 12. We say that an ontological model of quantum theory is measurement noncontextual if
ξk|M(λ) = ξMk (λ),
that is, if the response function associated to the outcome k of a measurement M depends only on
the measurement operator Mk. Analogously, we say that an ontological model of quantum theory is
preparation noncontextual if
µP(λ) = µρ(λ),
that is, if the ontic state associated to the preparation procedure P depends only on the quantum state ρ
that is prepared.
What else could the ontic state µP(λ) possibly depend on? Well, in the ontological models
we discussed in sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 it depended on the “true” basis of ρ, making these
states preparation contextual. It could also depend on the “true” purification of ρ, or really
anything that one might deem plausible or implausible. What about measurements? Well, the
most famous sort of context is that of Bell’s definition of contextuality: the whole PVM M, as
do the ontological models discussed on section 1.9.2, but it could also be anything, such as the
colour of the measurement apparatus, the latitude and longitude of the laboratory where the
experiment is performed, etc.
One final remark: if quantum theory were an ontological model of itself then definition 11
(and 12) would imply that it is not contextual, since it is trivial to prove that
tr ρMk = tr ρM′k ∀ρ ⇒ Mk = M′k
and
tr ρMk = tr σMk ∀Mk ⇒ ρ = σ.
Since it is not, the oft-heard claim that “quantum mechanics is contextual” is just meaningless.
What one probably means with it is that any ontological model of quantum theory must be
contextual, repeating a situation that happen in the area of nonlocality: quantum mechanics is
obviously a local theory, in the relativistic sense, but any ontological model of quantum theory
must be nonlocal, leading to the meaningless sentence “quantum mechanics is nonlocal”.
1.5 Contextuality for preparation procedures
In this section we shall show that it is not possible to construct a preparation noncontextual
ontological model of quantum theory [11]. This is not the conflict with quantum theory usually
discussed, but we feel that it is appropriate to begin with it for three reasons:
1. It is independent of assumptions on determinism
2. It is simple
3. It is novel
To begin, we’ll need to prove a simple lemma about how orthogonal states are represented
in the ontic space Λ. We’ll see that the possibility of distinguishing orthogonal states with
certainty by a single-shot measurement implies that their representations in the ontic space
must have disjoint support.
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Lemma 13. If two quantum states ρ and σ are orthogonal then the corresponding ontic states µρ and
µσ have disjoint support:
ρσ = 0 ⇒ µρ(λ)µσ(λ) = 0 ∀λ
Proof. If ρ and σ are orthogonal, then they can be distinguished with certainty in a single-shot
measurement. To construct one such measurement, note that the supports of ρ and σ must be
orthogonal, and let Πρ be the projector onto the support of ρ. Then
tr ρΠρ = 1 and tr σΠρ = 0.
Writing these measurements ontologically, we have∫
Λ
µρξΠρ = 1 and
∫
Λ
µσξΠρ = 0,
so ξΠρ(λ) = 1 for all λ in the support of µρ, and ξΠρ(λ) = 0 for all λ in the support of µσ, so
the supports of µρ and µσ are disjoint, and µρ(λ)µσ(λ) = 0 for all λ.
We will also need the assumption that is violated by all the ontological models discussed so
far:
Assumption 2 (Preparation noncontextuality).
∑
i
piψi =∑
i
qiφi ⇒ µ(pi ,ψi)(λ) = µ(qi ,φi)(λ)
With the groundwork laid, we can now state the theorem and prove it.
Theorem 14 (Spekkens [11]). It is not possible to embed quantum theory into a preparation noncon-
textual ontological theory.
Proof. Let φ, Φ, χ, X, ψ, and Ψ be quantum states such that
0 = φΦ = χX = ψΨ (1.5a)
1 = φ+Φ = χ+ X = ψ+Ψ (1.5b)
3
2
1 = φ+ χ+ ψ = Φ+ X+Ψ. (1.5c)
That such a family of states exists can be proven by exhibiting an example in dimension 2, that
can be easily embedded in higher dimensions:
|φ〉 = |0〉 |Φ〉 = |1〉 (1.6a)
|χ〉 = 1
2
|0〉+
√
3
2
|1〉 |X〉 =
√
3
2
|0〉 − 1
2
|1〉 (1.6b)
|ψ〉 = 1
2
|0〉 −
√
3
2
|1〉 |Ψ〉 =
√
3
2
|0〉+ 1
2
|1〉 (1.6c)
A nice way to visualize the orthogonality and completeness relations (1.5) is to represent states
(1.6) in the σx, σz plane of the Bloch sphere, as done in figure 1.1.
Now we shall use lemmas 1 and 13 together with assumption 2 and relations (1.5) to derive
a contradiction. Lemma 13 together with (1.5a) implies that
µφ(λ)µΦ(λ) = µχ(λ)µX(λ) = µψ(λ)µΨ(λ) = 0 ∀λ (1.7)
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Figure 1.1: Representation of states (1.6) in the σx, σz plane of the Bloch sphere. The barycenter
of antipodal states or states which are connected by a triangle is 1/2.
Lemma 1, together with assumption 2 and relations (1.5b), implies that
µ 1
2 1
=
1
2
(
µφ + µΦ
)
(1.8a)
=
1
2
(µχ + µX) (1.8b)
=
1
2
(
µψ + µΨ
)
, (1.8c)
and together with relations (1.5c)
µ 1
2 1
=
1
3
(
µφ + µχ + µψ
)
(1.9a)
=
1
3
(µΦ + µX + µΨ). (1.9b)
We shall conclude the proof by showing that the only simultaneous solution to (1.8), (1.9),
and (1.7) is the all-zero solution
µφ(λ) = µΦ(λ) = µχ(λ) = µX(λ) = µψ(λ) = µΨ(λ) = 0 ∀λ,
which is absurd, since probability distributions can’t be zero everywhere.
The disjointness relations (1.7) imply that for each λ at least one of µφ and µΦ must be zero,
and the same for the other letters. Therefore there are 8 different cases to examine, although
only two are essentially different. The first one is when µφ, µχ, and µψ are zero. Then (1.9)
implies that µΦ, µX, and µΨ must also be zero. The second case is when µΦ, µχ, and µψ are
zero. Then (1.8a) implies that µ 1
2 1
= 12µφ, and (1.9a) implies that µ 12 1
= 13µφ. But the only
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solution to 12µφ =
1
3µφ is µφ = 0, and we can apply the previous argument to show that all
probability distributions must be zero. The six remaining cases are simply relabellings of these
two.
As the above argument applies to every λ, we have that all probability distributions are
zero for every λ, and thus are not probability distributions.
1.6 Gleason theorems
There are three theorems that I call “Gleason theorems”: von Neumann’s theorem [15],
Gleason’s theorem [27] and Busch’s theorem [28]. Of these three, the most famous is certainly
Gleason’s19, and that is why I chose to name this section after it. All three theorems share a
similar structure: they postulate some properties that a measurement µ should have, and then
prove that the only measurement that satisfies those properties is the quantum mechanical one
µ(A) = tr ρA. They can be interpreted in two ways:
1. As an axiomatic improvement, by showing that the notion of quantum state and Born’s
rule follow from weaker axioms.
2. As excluding deterministic ontological theories, by saying that properties of µ should
be true in any theory, not only in quantum mechanics. Then one only has to notice that
Born’s rule is not deterministic.
If one chooses the first interpretation, all three theorems are perfectly fine, and in fact quite
similar. Problems arise, however, if one insists on interpreting them as excluding deterministic
ontological theories. Then von Neumann’s theorem becomes foolish20 [5], as its assumptions
already excludes a large class of ontological theories, without good reason.
1.6.1 von Neumann’s theorem
Theorem 15 (von Neumann [15]). Let A, B be self-adjoint operators, and µ : O(H)→ R a function
such that
1. µ(αA) = αµ(A) for real α.
2. µ(A + B) = µ(A) + µ(B) for commuting A, B.
3. µ(A + B) = µ(A) + µ(B) for non-commuting A, B.
4. µ(1) = 1
5. µ(A) ≥ 0 for positive A.
Then any such function can be written as
µ(Π) = tr ρΠ,
where ρ is a positive operator of unit trace.
19The most infamous being von Neumann’s. Busch’s theorem is still new.
20The hasty reader might wonder why learn a foolish theorem. A quick answer would be to avoid repeating
mistakes of the past [29, 30]. For a longer answer, read the section.
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Proof. Properties 1, 2, and 3 establish that µ is a linear functional on O(H), and by the Riesz
lemma can be represented as an inner product µ(A) = tr ρA. Property 4 then implies that
ρ has unity trace, as µ(1) = tr ρ1 = tr ρ = 1, and property 5 implies its positivity, since in
particular projectors are positive operators, and µ(|ψ〉〈ψ|) = tr ρ|ψ〉〈ψ| = 〈ψ|ρ|ψ〉 ≥ 0 for all ψ
is the definition of positivity.
We can see, then, that the theorem itself is quite simple, and its value resides in the strength
of its assumptions, which we shall examine now. The first thing one may notice is that the
theorem already makes use of the Hilbert space formalism for the observables, and the fact
that the states also follow the same formalism seems almost like a tautology. But this is not
the case. Quantum mechanics can already implement this formalism in experiments in a quite
successful manner, and one may regard observable A as just a proxy for the experiment that
implements it; as µ can be any function a priori (we don’t even assume it is continuous), there
is not limitation in using O(H) as its domain. We shall now proceed to examine the physical
content of the assumptions.
Assumption 1 and 2 can be interpreted as doing classical post-processing to the data of
a single experiment, the measurement of a PVM {Πi}, that we define from the eigendecom-
position of A. The multiplication of A by a constant is implemented just by multiplying its
eigenvalues by the same constant. To implement the observable A + B corresponding to the
sum of commuting operators A and B one notices that they can be diagonalized simultaneously
as A = ∑i aiΠi and B = ∑i biΠi, and so their sum A + B = ∑i(ai + bi)Πi is just a combination
and rescaling of the data coming from the Πi outputs. Assumptions 4 and 5 can be justified
by the possibility of interpreting µ(Πi) as a probability: probabilities are positive, and some
outcome must happen.
The one which is harder to justify is assumption 3, since A, B, and A + B correspond to
different experimental configurations: so the possibility of measuring A + B just by processing
the data coming from the PVMs that measure A or B is excluded. Its justification comes from
the fact that in quantum mechanics tr ρ(A + B) = tr ρA + tr ρB, and our ontological theory
must reproduce its results. But this is where von Neumann slips, and to make the slip more
clear, it’s best to use the ontological notation, the correspondence being µ(A) = ξA(λ). So
assumption 3 translates to
ξA+B(λ) = ξA(λ) + ξB(λ),
which is clearly overkill, since correspondence with quantum mechanics only requires that∫
Λ
µρξA+B =
∫
Λ
µρξA +
∫
Λ
µρξB,
that is, that the expected values correspond, not the values of the response functions themselves.
For instance, in the Bell-Mermin model, discussed in appendix A, we can see that the response
function (A.1) is clearly linear with respect to the sum of commuting observables21
A = a01+ a · σ and B = b01+ b · σ = b01+ αa · σ,
21Note that A and B commute iff b = αa for some real α.
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as
ξA+B(ψ,λ) = a0 + b0 + ‖a + αa‖ sign((a + αa) · (λ+ ψˆ))
= a0 + b0 + |1+ α|‖a‖ sign(1+ α) sign(a · (λ+ ψˆ))
= a0 + ‖a‖ sign(a · (λ+ ψˆ)) + b0 + α‖a‖ sign(a · (λ+ ψˆ))
= ξA(ψ,λ) + ξB(ψ,λ),
since the values that ξA assumes are the eigenvalues of A, and eigenvalues are linear with
respect to the sum of commuting observables. Of course, this is not true when the observables
do not commute, as we can see in the following example:
ξσx+σz(ψ,λ) =
√
2 sign(λx + ψx + λz + ψz)
6= sign(λx + ψx) + sign(λz + ψz)
= ξσx (ψ,λ) + ξσz(ψ,λ).
Therefore, we must conclude that this assumption is unfounded, and if no justification can
be found to it, we must abandon von Neumann’s prohibition of ontological models. We shall
see, however, that even if we abandon this assumption, we can still prove a von Neumann-like
theorem, valid in a more restricted context: that is Gleason’s theorem. More surprisingly,
however, is the fact that this assumption can be justified, by the consideration of POVMs. This
realisation is what motivated the proof of Busch’s theorem.
1.6.2 Gleason’s theorem
Andrew Gleason was not concerned with von Neumann’s theorem, not even with the problem
of ontological models for quantum mechanics. His goal was to study the mathematical
foundations of quantum mechanics, and to strengthen its axiomatic basis by showing that
essentially every measure on a Hilbert space is given by Born’s rule [27]. Its significance to the
exclusion of ontological models of quantum mechanics was first noticed by Bell [4], who also
remarked that contextual ontological models were not bound by Gleason’s theorem.
Theorem 16 (Gleason [27]). Let H be a separable Hilbert space over C with dimH ≥ 3, and
µ : P(H) → [0, 1] a function such that ∑i µ(Πi) = 1 for any PVM {Πi}. Then any such function
can be written as
µ(Πi) = tr ρΠi,
where ρ is a positive operator of unity trace.
The proof of this theorem is already well-known, and a bit boring, so we shall omit it. The
interested reader may find it in the original work [27], or in the clearer version by Bell [4].
It is easy to see that von Neumann’s µ functions satisfy all the properties of Gleason’s
µ functions, and continue to do so even if we drop his questionable assumption 3, so it is
certainly possible to interpret Gleason’s theorem as a “reasonable” von Neumann theorem,
with weaker assumptions. Also notice that Gleason’s assumptions are explicitly non-contextual,
by assuming that µ(Πi) is only a function of the projector Πi, and not of the whole PVM.
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1.6.3 Busch’s theorem
Paul Busch was concerned with the justification of von Neumann’s assumption 3. He noticed
that if one measures a POVM {Ei} instead of a PVM, then it is possible to have in a single
experiment two outcomes E0 and E1 that do not commute22, so it is perfectly natural to
demand that µ(E0 + E1) = µ(E0) + µ(E1), since one can measure E0 + E1 just by combining
the outcomes corresponding to E0 and E1. He then restricted assumption 3 to sums of effects
belonging to a single POVM, and was able to derive Born’s rule from it, thus resurrecting
von Neumann’s theorem [31]. Later he realized that the form of his theorem was actually
closer to Gleason’s than von Neumann’s; to obtain it from Gleason’s one only has to demand
∑i µ(Πi) = 1 to be true for POVMs, instead of just form PVMs. Interpreted in this way, his
theorem is a much stronger version of Gleason’s with a much simpler proof [28].
The proof presented here mostly follows the one presented in [1], with the difference that it
does not require the domain of µ to be extended.
Theorem 17 (Busch [28]). Let H be a separable Hilbert space over23 Q[i] or C, and µ : E(H)→ [0, 1]
a function such that ∑i µ(Ei) = 1 for any POVM {Ei}. Then any such function can be written as
µ(Ei) = tr ρEi,
where ρ is a positive operator of unity trace.
Proof. The proof begins by noticing that µ is in fact a linear functional on E(H). From that,
the Riesz lemma establishes that it can represented as an inner product. Positivity and
normalization of ρ then comes from the positivity and normalization of µ. We shall first prove
the case where H is over the complex rationals, and later extend the proof to the continuum.
First note that if E is an effect, 1−E is also an effect. Then considering the POVMs {E, 1− E}
and {E1, E2, . . . , En, 1− E}, where ∑i Ei = E, we see that µ(E) = ∑i µ(Ei). Considering the
particular case Ei = E/n, we get that µ(E) = nµ(E/n). On the other hand, if we consider
E = mF and Ei = F, we get µ(mF) = mµ(F). Combining these two cases, we see that
µ(mn E) = mµ(
1
n E) =
m
n µ(E), that is, µ(qE) = qµ(E) for q ∈ Q+ whenever both qE and E are
effects. Wrapping up, we have that
µ(E) =∑
i
qiµ(Ei)
for rational qi whenever qiEi are effects, so µ already has some restricted linearity. If we can
remove the restriction that qiEi are effects, we get full linearity on E(H), and that’s what we’ll
do now.
Consider the effects E and F ≤ E. Then E = E− F + F, and µ(E) = µ(E− F) + µ(F), so
µ(E− F) = µ(E)− µ(F). Consider now E, F, G ∈ E(H) and p, q ∈ Q+ such that E = pF− qG,
but at least one of p and q is larger than unity, so pF and qG are not necessarily effects. Without
loss of generality, let p ≥ q. Then 1p E, F, and qp G are all effects, and by the property we just
proved, µ( 1q E) = µ(F)− µ( qp G), so µ(E) = pµ(F)− qµ(G) and
µ(E) =∑
i
qiµ(Ei)
22In fact, this happens in all non-trivial POVMs..
23Q[i] is the field extension of the rationals Q with the imaginary number i, Q[i] = {a + ib : a, b ∈ Q}.
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for any rational qi, so we have full linearity on E(H). Let then {Ei}d
2
i=1 be a MIC-POVM and, as
such, a basis for H. Then any effect E can be written as E = ∑d2i=1 qiEi for qi ∈ Q (a moment’s
thought will convince you that complex numbers aren’t allowed). We can now define ρ by
solving the d2 equations tr ρEi = µ(Ei), and see that
µ(E) =
d2
∑
i=1
qiµ(Ei) =
d2
∑
i=1
qi tr ρEi = tr
(
ρ
d2
∑
i=1
qiEi
)
= tr ρE.
Positivity of ρ comes from considering the case where E is a one-dimensional projector:
0 ≤ tr ρE = tr ρ|ψ〉〈ψ| = 〈ψ|ρ|ψ〉.
The unity of the trace comes from
1 =∑
i
µ(Ei) =∑
i
tr ρEi = tr
(
ρ∑
i
Ei
)
= tr ρ.
This completes the proof for Q[i]. To extend it to the continuum, note again that if E ≥ F,
then µ(E) = µ(E− F) + µ(F), and so µ(E) ≥ µ(F). Let then pi and qi be sequences of rational
numbers tending to the real number α such that pi ≤ α ≤ qi. We have piE ≤ αE ≤ qiE, and
as such piµ(E) ≤ µ(αE) ≤ qiµ(E), so µ(αE) = αµ(E). From this fact, one can now retrace the
proof and see that it also holds for C.
The reason that we decided to highlight the fact that Busch’s theorem holds for Q[i] is
that the original Gleason theorem fails for it, hinting that traditional contextuality might have
problems dealing with subsets of C [32, 33]. This feature of Busch’s theorem was first noticed
in [34].
1.6.4 Wrapping up
Busch’s theorem is clearly superior to von Neumann’s in every way, but this is not true for
Gleason’s: they can be interpreted in different ways. Busch’s shows that there can’t be a
non-contextual model capable of reproducing quantum mechanics in any dimension, while
Gleason’s opens up the possibility of such a model existing in dimension two, if we only
care about projective measurements. That such a model exists can be seen by looking at the
Bell-Mermin model in appendix A; but if, like Gleason, the reader is not interested in the
question of ontological theories, but in which measures are allowed given the Hilbert space
structure of observables, the following counterexample24 should suffice:
µψ(φ) =
1
2
(1+ cos(n cos−1(φˆ · ψˆ))), odd n
Note that for n = 1 this formula is simply Born’s rule.
24Due to Marcelo Terra Cunha and Rafael Rabelo.
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It is easy to check that
∑
i
µ(Πi) = µψ(φ) + µψ(1− φ)
=
1
2
(1+ cos(n cos−1(φˆ · ψˆ))) + 1
2
(1+ cos(n cos−1(φˆ · ψˆ) + pi))
=
1
2
(1+ cos(n cos−1(φˆ · ψˆ))) + 1
2
(1− cos(n cos−1(φˆ · ψˆ)))
= 1,
as required in Gleason’s assumptions.
To see that for n ≥ 3 this formula can’t equal Born’s rule, notice that
trψφ =
1
2
(1+ φˆ · ψˆ)
only has one root, if considered as a function of the angle cos−1(φˆ · ψˆ), whereas our µψ(φ) has
n roots.
1.7 The Kochen-Specker theorem
A corollary of the Gleason theorem is that one can’t embed quantum theory in a noncontextual
ontological model if dimH ≥ 3, since the Born rule is explicitly noncontextual and non-
deterministic; a direct proof of this fact might seem superfluous. But one might not like
its assumptions: after all, it already assumes a fair bit of structure that is not quite needed
and, more importantly, it needs to assume that the quantum valuation µ(Πi) is defined for a
continuous amount of projectors, which of course can never have experimental justification.
This was the motivation25 for Simon Kochen and Ernst Specker to develop a finite proof of
noncontextuality, finding an inconsistency in any deterministic assignment of values to a set of
experiments realizable in quantum mechanics [14]. Another motivation to present it here is
that it proves the claim in section 1.2.2 that noncontextual deterministic ontological models can
not describe two-outcome PVMs.
In modern parlance, the Kochen-Specker theorem is referred to as a proof of state-
independent contextuality, as the logical contradiction found depends only on the structure of
quantum observables, and not on the statistics from the measurement of specific states. This
situation contrasts, of course, with proofs of state-dependent contextuality, which we shall
explore mainly on the next chapter.
More specifically, their proof says that we can’t attribute deterministic values ξΠi (λ) to a
set of projectors {Πi}117i=1 in dimension three respecting the quantum mechanical observation
that in the measurement of a PVM one answer (and only one answer) always occurs. An
elegant way to proceed with the proof is to represent this set of projectors in an orthogonality
graph (where each vertex corresponds to a projector, and two vertices are connected iff the
corresponding projectors are orthogonal), and map the quantum mechanical observation into
two rules for colouring the graph:
1. Two connected vertices can’t both have the value 1 – If two projectors Πi and Πj are
orthogonal, they can be measured simultaneously, and therefore ξΠi (λ) and ξΠj(λ) can’t
both equal 1.
25The motivation can come from Gleason’s theorem, or from a 1960 work of Specker [35, 36], that was independent
of Gleason and also contained a “continuous” proof of contextuality.
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2. In a loop of three connected vertices, one of them must have the value 1 – If three
projectors are mutually orthogonal, they form a PVM, and in a PVM one answer (and
only one answer) always occurs.
The proof concludes by showing that no such colouring of the graph can exist, and therefore
one can’t attribute deterministic values to this set of projectors. We shall, however, omit it.
Even though it is quite beautiful, the proof is mainly of historical interest, as simpler proofs
have hitherto been found. We refer the interested reader to the original paper, or the excellent
exposition of it by Cabello [37].
1.7.1 An 18-projector proof by Cabello, Estebaranz, and García-Alcaine
The simplest (with fewest projectors) such no-colouring proof that we currently know26 was
found in 1996 by Cabello, Estebaranz, and García-Alcaine [40]. In contrast with Kochen-
Specker’s 117 projectors, it needs only 18 to generate a contradiction. These projectors are
represented in figure 1.2, where v = (a, b, c, d) is just a shorthand notation for the projector onto
|v〉 = a|0〉+ b|1〉+ c|2〉+ d|3〉. This figure does not represent an orthogonality graph, which
would be quite cumbersome, but an orthogonality hypergraph, where sets of four commuting
projectors are connected by edges of the same colour.
v =(1,0,0,0)12
v =(0,1,0,0)18v =(0,0,0,1)28
v =(0,1,1,0)29 v =(0,0,1,1)17
v =(0,0,1,-1)16v =(0,1,-1,0)23
v =(1,-1,0,0)67v =(1,0,0,1)39
v =(1,1,1,-1)37 v =(1,1,-1,-1)69
v =(1,1,1,1)56v =(-1,1,1,1)34
v =(1,1,-1,1)47
v =(1,0,1,0)48 v (1,0,-1,0)=58
v =(1,-1,1,-1)59
v =(0,1,0,-1)45
Figure 1.2: Vectors for the 18-projector proof of the Kochen-Specker theorem. Reproduced from
[41] with permission from the author.
26We do know that in dimensions 3 and 4 there are no no-colouring proofs with 17 projectors or less [38, 39].
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One could in fact proceed to prove directly that it is non-colourable (there are few non-
equivalent potential colourings), but it is more elegant to use a parity argument: we know that
in each context we must have one answer 1, so the sum over all answers in all contexts must be
9. But if we do this sum projector by projector, we see that each projector appears in exactly
two contexts, and likewise each answer appears twice, so the sum over them must be an even
number, a contradiction.
1.7.2 A 13-projector proof by Yu and Oh
Shockingly, more recently it has been found that a non-colourable graph is not necessary to
prove state-independent contextuality. Yu and Oh [42] have found such a proof in dimension 3
based on a set of 13 projectors that does have a colouring that obeys rules 1 and 2. They argue
that every possible colouring of their graph contradicts another prediction of quantum theory.
The orthogonality graph is represented in figure 1.3, and its quantum realization is given by
the vectors
z1 = (1, 0, 0) h0 = (1, 1, 1) y+1 = (0, 1, 1)
z2 = (0, 1, 0) h1 = (−1, 1, 1) y−1 = (0, 1,−1)
z3 = (0, 0, 1) h2 = (1,−1, 1) y+2 = (1, 0, 1)
h3 = (1, 1,−1) y−2 = (−1, 0, 1)
y+3 = (1, 1, 0)
y−3 = (1,−1, 0)
where r = (a, b, c) is just a shorthand notation for the projector onto |r〉 = a|0〉+ b|1〉+ c|2〉. It is
important for the proof that this is actually the unique quantum realization of the orthogonality
graph up to a global unitary transformation, which is trivial to prove.
To obtain the contradiction with quantum mechanics, first note that no two hi can be
assigned 1 simultaneously. We shall prove this by contradiction. By the symmetry of the graph,
there are only two cases:
1. Assume that ξh0(λ) = ξh1(λ) = 1. Then by the KS rules we must assign 0 to y
±
2 and y
±
3 ,
which oblige us to assign 1 to z2 and z3, a contradiction.
2. Assume that ξh1(λ) = ξh2(λ) = 1. Then by the KS rules we must assign 0 to y
±
1 and y
±
2 ,
which oblige us to assign 1 to z1 and z2, a contradiction.
This implies that ∑i ξhi (λ) ≤ 1, and furthermore that
∑
i
∫
Λ
µψξhi ≤ 1.
But the lhs must be equal to the quantum expectation value ∑i trψhi; since
∑
i
hi =
4
3
1,
we get that ∑i trψhi = 4/3 for any state, a contradiction.
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z1
z2 z3
y2
-
y2
+
y3
-
y3
+
y1
-y1
+
h1
h3
h2
h0
Figure 1.3: Orthogonality graph for the proof of Yu and Oh. Reproduced from [43] with
permission from the authors.
1.7.3 A 9-observable proof by Peres and Mermin
Last but not least, we’d like to present the beautiful proof of the Kochen-Specker theorem
done in 1990 by Asher Peres and David Mermin [44, 45], the Peres-Mermin square. It uses 9
four-dimensional observables, so in some sense it is larger than the previous two proofs, and
also older; but it is also quite elegant, and so it might seem smaller to the human mind.
Let
A =
 σz ⊗ 1 1⊗ σz σz ⊗ σz1⊗ σx σx ⊗ 1 σx ⊗ σx
σz ⊗ σx σx ⊗ σz σy ⊗ σy
 (1.10)
be the Peres-Mermin square, where σx, σy, and σz are Pauli matrices. Note that observables Aij
that lie in the same line or column always commute, so they are simultaneously measurable,
and we should be justified in assigning them a predefined value µ(Aij) = ξAij(λ) ∈ {−1,+1}.
But also note that the product of the observables in each line or column is always plus or
minus identity, relation that our predefined values should also respect. More specifically, this
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reasoning leads us to the relations
µ(σz ⊗ 1)µ(1⊗ σz)µ(σz ⊗ σz) = +1
µ(1⊗ σx)µ(σx ⊗ 1)µ(σx ⊗ σx) = +1
µ(σz ⊗ σx)µ(σx ⊗ σz)µ(σy ⊗ σy) = +1
µ(σz ⊗ 1)µ(1⊗ σx)µ(σz ⊗ σx) = +1
µ(1⊗ σz)µ(σx ⊗ 1)µ(σx ⊗ σz) = +1
µ(σz ⊗ σz)µ(σx ⊗ σx)µ(σy ⊗ σy) = −1
Note now that each predefined value appears twice in the lhs, so the product over all of them
must be +1. But the product over the rhs is −1, a contradiction.
1.8 Ontological excess baggage
What motivated Bell to prove his famous theorem was his observation that the ontological
theory of de Broglie-Bohm [46] has a grossly nonlocal character [4]. A natural question for him
was, then, whether this nonlocality was particular of Bohm’s mechanics or actually a general
character of any ontological theory [24].
In that same paper, however, Bell also noticed that to study a spin system within Bohm’s
theory he had to include the position degree of freedom, and reduce spin measurements to
position measurements. But by doing so he enlarged the number of real parameters required
to describe a single qubit from two to countable infinity, and worse, the number of ontological
states had to be uncountable infinity.
Hardy then asked whether this is a general feature of ontological theories, or just a
particularity of Bell’s model for a spin in Bohm’s theory, and found that the answer is yes [10],
naming this feature ontological excess baggage. His theorem is the subject of this section.
A perhaps more simple (certainly more direct) illustration of the ontological excess baggage
theorem can be found in the naïve ontological theory described in section 1.2.1, where we
identify the ontic space Λ with the space of pure states PH, thus forcing Λ to have the same
cardinality as it, that is, uncountable infinity.
Theorem 18 (Hardy [10]). In any ontological embedding of quantum theory the ontic space Λ is
infinite.
Proof. Let ψ and φ be two pure quantum states, ψ 6= φ. Then there is a measurement ψ for
which tr(ψψ) = 1, whereas tr(ψφ) < 1. Writing these measurements ontologically, we have∫
Λ
µψξψ = 1 and
∫
Λ
µφξψ < 1,
that is, ξψ(λ) = 1 for all λ in the support of µψ(λ), but there is a λ0 in the support of µφ(λ) for
which ξψ(λ0) < 1. Consequently, λ0 is not in the support of µψ(λ), and we see that different
ontic states must have different supports. This constitutes an injection of PH into P(Λ), i.e.,
the set of distinct subsets of Λ, thus proving that P(Λ) is uncountable. This is only possible if
Λ itself is infinite (though not necessarily uncountable).
This proof is based on the one presented in27 [47].
27Note that Spekkens’ claim that Λ itself is uncountable is incorrect.
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One might wonder whether this argument can be extended to show that Λ must be
uncountable; after all, in all our examples it is, and we have not considered all the information
we have: notice that it is never true that the support of µφ contains the support of µψ – they are
pairwise incomparable – so we have an injection into a subset of P(Λ), which might have a
smaller cardinality than it. But this hope is unfounded: there is a set Z of subsets of N that
has pairwise incomparable members but continuous cardinality. This was proved by Martin
Goldstern as an answer to a MathOverflow question by the author [48].
Theorem 19. There is a set Z of subsets of N that has pairwise incomparable members but continuous
cardinality.
Proof. For any subset A ⊆ N, let XA = {2n : n ∈ A}, YA = {2n + 1 : n 6∈ A}, and
ZA = XA ∪YA. Then the set of all ZA is uncountable, since there is an injection of P(N) into
it. Also note XA ∩YA = ∅, and therefore ZA ⊆ ZB implies that XA ⊆ XB and YA ⊆ YB. This in
turn implies that A ⊆ B and B ⊆ A, hence A = B. So the ZA are pairwise incomparable.
But why is Hardy’s theorem interesting? After all, if we’re not bothered by the fact that
the set of quantum states D(H) is uncountable, why should we be bothered by the fact that
Λ is infinite? It all has to do with the status of the pure states. If they’re not ontological, the
description of the Bloch ball as a vector space of dimension three is perfectly natural. But if
we insist in giving ontological status to |0〉 and |+〉, it becomes a mystery the identification
of the preparation procedures
{(
1
2 , |0〉
)
,
(
1
2 , |1〉
)}
and
{(
1
2 , |+〉
)
,
(
1
2 , |−〉
)}
or, ontologically
speaking, the states 12µ|0〉 +
1
2µ|1〉 and
1
2µ|+〉 +
1
2µ|−〉. In fact, if we remember theorem 14,
we know that we can’t do this identification, as it is precisely the assumption of preparation
noncontextuality, which we showed to be untenable. But if we don’t do this identification,
the Bloch ball must explode: the set of all ontic states must be the infinite-dimensional set of
probability distributions over the pure states.
1.9 How to make an ontological theory?
In light of all these no-go theorems (and “please-don’t-go” theorems), one is left to wonder how
ugly it would look deterministic ontological models that reproduced all of quantum theory (as
opposed to the restricted models presented in sections 1.2.2, 1.3.1, and appendix A). In fact,
they don’t look so bad on the paper, as their necessary ugliness is more philosophical than
mathematical. There are, of course, models that are quite intricate, such as de Broglie-Bohm’s
theory. We shall ignore it, however, as we feel that an appropriate exposition of it would be too
much of a digression. What we shall present is the contextual model proposed by Bell in his
critique of the Gleason theorem [4], together with a ψ-epistemic modification of it [49].
1.9.1 The Bell model
This ψ-ontic model was proposed by Bell in [4]; we present it here as rendered in [49].
The ontic space for this model is Λ = PH× [0, 1], the ontic state is
µψ(λψ) = δ(λψ − ψ),
and the response functions are given by
ξk|φ(λψ,λ) =
[
k−1
∑
i=0
trλψφi < λ ≤
k
∑
i=0
trλψφi
]
,
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where [ ] are Iverson brackets28, the empty sum ∑−1i=0 trλψφi is 0, and normalization requires
us to set ξ0|φ(λψ, 0) = 1. Note that for dimPH = 2 this model reduces to the one discussed
is section 1.2.2.
This model is easily seen to be contextual, since ξk|φ(λψ,λ) depends non-trivially on the
whole PVM φ.
1.9.2 The Lewis-Jennings-Barrett-Rudolph model
This model [49] was proposed as a complement to the pbr theorem (theorem 7), showing that it
is in fact possible to make a contextual ψ-epistemic model that reproduces quantum mechanics.
With it, we complete the discussion of ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic models that began in section
1.3.
As this model is a bit complicated, we shall study first its version for dimension 2, in order
to clarify the ideas, and then proceed to the general case. The response functions used are the
same ones as the previous model, whereas the ontic states will be modified in order to become
ψ-epistemic.
Let zˆ correspond to the north pole of the Bloch sphere, and u · zˆ = cos θu define the polar
angle θu of a unit vector u. Then we can define the northern hemisphere N as the set of vectors
with θu < pi/2, and label the measurement {φ0, φ1} in such a way that θφ0 ≤ θφ1 .
The model is based on the observation that if ψˆ ∈ N , then the probability trψφ0 will be
strictly larger than 0 for any measurement φ0. This observation has two consequences. The
first is that we can define a lower bound f (ψ) for trψφ0 that does not depend on φ0, as
trψφ0 =
1
2
(1+ cos θψφ0) ≥
1
2
(1+ cos(θψ + pi/2)) = f (ψ).
The second is that there exists a set of ontic states
ΛN =
{
(λψ,λ) : λψ ∈ N and 0 ≤ λ < f (ψ)
}
such that for any state (λψ,ψ) in it we have that ξφ0(λψ,λ) = 1. Using all this, we can define a
ontic state µψ for ψˆ ∈ N :
µψ(λψ,λ) = δ(λψ − ψ)Θ(λ− f (ψ)) + f (ψ)UΛN ,
where UΛN is the uniform distribution on ΛN . Notice that all these states overlap in the set
ΛN . The quantum statistics are recovered by
p(0|ψ, φ) =
∫
Λ
µψξ0|φ
=
∫
Λ
Θ(λ− f (ψ))Θ(trψφ0 − λ) + f (ψ)
∫
Λ
UΛNΘ(trλψφ0 − λ)
= trψφ0 − f (ψ) + f (ψ)
∫
Λ
UΛN
= trψφ0.
For the case ψˆ 6∈ N , we let µψ(λψ,λ) = δ(λψ − ψ), as usual.
To make the generalization to dimension d, label the measurement {φi} in such a way
that trΠφ0 ≥ trΠφ1 ≥ . . . ≥ trΠφd−1, where Π is an arbitrary state. Now we want to define
28Defined as [P] = 1 if the proposition P is true and [P] = 0 otherwise.
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the analogue of N , i.e., a set N ′ such that for any ψ in it we have trψφ0 > 0. To do that,
first note that trΠφ0 ≥ 1/d, since trΠφi are the elements of a probability vector. Now note
that trψφ0 = 0 implies that ψ ≤ 1− φ0, so trΠψ ≤ trΠ(1− φ0) ≤ 1− 1/d, and therefore
trΠψ > (d− 1)/d implies that trψφ0 > 0. With that in hand, we can now proceed to finding
the analogue of f (ψ), i.e., a lower bound on trψφ0 that does not depend on φ0. Since its
existence is clear, we shall not bother looking for an explicit expression and just call it f ′(ψ).
The analogue of ΛN is then
Λ′N =
{
(λψ,λ) : λψ ∈ N ′ and 0 ≤ λ < f ′(λψ)
}
,
and the ontic state, for ψ ∈ N ′, is
µψ = δ(λψ − ψ)Θ(λ− f ′(ψ)) + f ′(ψ)UΛ′N .
For ψ 6∈ N ′, we let µψ(λψ,λ) = δ(λψ − ψ), as usual. This makes the model not “maximally
ψ-epistemic”, that is, it is not true that for every pair of non-orthogonal states ψ and φ the ontic
states µψ and µφ have a non-zero overlap. This raises the question: is a “maximally ψ-epistemic”
model possible? This question was raised by the authors of [49] themselves, and answered by
George Lowther and Scott Aaronson in the affirmative [50].
Chapter 2
Revealing surrealism
Make it simple, because I can only
understand simple things.
Asher Peres
Reading the previous chapter must have felt like walking in sand, with the definitions and
assumptions being challenged and changed all the time. This is unfortunate, but necessary for
such a discussion of the foundations of quantum mechanics. In this chapter, however, we shall
use what we learned and develop a final definition of contextuality, which will serve as a solid
foundation for the work ahead.
Instead of trying to find an ontological embedding of quantum theory, we shall just accept
that it can’t be done, and try to characterize exactly which parts of quantum mechanics
can’t be embedded in an (noncontextual) ontological theory. We shall do this by examining
the probability distributions over certain events1: if such a probability distribution can’t be
reproduced by a noncontextual ontological theory, we shall deem it truly quantum. What for,
you ask? These probability distributions will be a resource to do what is impossible in classical
theories: quantum computation with an exponential speedup and quantum distribution of
cryptographic keys, among other things. In other words, quantum magic.
2.1 The correct definition of contextuality
The first thing we need to do is to obtain our final definition of contextuality. As we discussed
in section 1.4, we need a definition that is not specifically about quantum mechanics, but
instead about probability distributions, as is the case of the definition of locality. This need
was recognized by Robert Spekkens in 2005 [11], but he stopped short of doing that: Spekkens
arrived at a definition that talked about ontological models instead of quantum theory. His
definition (at least, the part of it about measurements) can easily be turned into a definition
that only talks about probability distributions, it shall be our definition 24. However, we shall
argue that this definition misses the essential point about contextuality.
This necessity was also recognized by Adam Brandenburger and Noson Yanofsky in 2008
[51], but this work limited itself to translating the various notions of contextuality that exist in
the literature into statements about probability distributions. It did not try to judge them and
obtain a final definition of contextuality.
1“Which events?”, you ask. That is the question; for a partial answer, read the rest of the chapter.
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Prompted by the discovery2 of the Klyachko inequality3 [52, 53], this important job was
finally done by Adán Cabello, Simone Severini, and Andreas Winter in 2010 [54] (see also
[55]), where they unified contextuality with the notion of nonlocality and provided elegant
algorithms to calculate the relevant properties4. But they did not provide the sorely needed
in-depth discussion of the definition of contextuality.
A clear and well-motivated exposition of the (now) accepted definition of contextuality was
finally done by Samson Abramsky and Adam Brandenburger in 2011 [56], where they based
their definition on the marginal problem and the Fine theorem (these concepts are discussed
in section 2.2). Unfortunately, the authors have chosen to write this paper in the language of
category theory, making it inaccessible to most physicists. A clearer explanation of some of
their concepts can be found in [57–59].
Now, we shall present this definition and argue that it must be the “correct” one. Of course,
this statement implies that the definitions discussed in section 1.4 were wrong. In fact, it is
quite a surprise that the correct definition took 44 years to appear, since the notion was first
discussed in [4]. One could also argue5 that it should be considered 50 years [35, 36], or even
148 years [60].
This language is purposefully provocative and should be considered somewhat tongue-in-
cheek, as it does not make sense, strictly speaking, to talk about correct or incorrect definitions.
We do believe, however, that the new definition is a significant improvement over the old ones,
as it is already proving itself more fruitful.
To begin, let’s start with our muse, the definition of locality:
Definition 20 (Locality). A set of probability distributions p(ai, bj|Ai, Bj), where A and B refer to
independent systems, is local if there exist response functions ξai |Ai (λ), ξbj |Bj(λ) and a probability
distribution µ(λ) such that
p(ai, bj|Ai, Bj) =
∫
Λ
dλ µ(λ)ξai |Ai (λ)ξbj |Bj(λ) (2.1)
This definition was motivated by the belief that “correlations cry out for explanation” [61]
or, to put it differently6, “for those who know λ there are no correlations”, which could be
interpreted as7
ξai ,bj |Ai ,Bj(λ) = ξai |Ai (λ)ξbj |Bj(λ) (2.2)
Note that equation (2.2) can in fact be proved8 (and, consequently, (2.1)) if we assume that
ξai ,bj |Ai ,Bj(λ) is deterministic and non-signalling:
Definition 21 (No-signalling). We say that a set of probability distributions is non-signalling if for
every Ai the marginal
p(ai|Ai, Bj) =∑
bj
p(ai, bj|Ai, Bj)
does not depend on Bj, where A and B refer to independent systems.
2Or rather its publication in Physical Review Letters.
3Note that these papers claim to exclude any ontological models, including contextual ones. This claim is incorrect.
4We shall discuss this work in section 2.6.
5But we’re not going to.
6As Marco Túlio does [62].
7Of course, we demand that p(x|X ) = ∫Λ dλ µ(λ)ξx|X (λ) for every x,X , if anything is to make sense.
8This proof seems to be part of the folklore.
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Lemma 22. Every deterministic probability distribution p(ai, bj|Ai, Bj) is factorizable, i.e., there exist
probability distributions p(ai|Ai, Bj) and p(bj|Ai, Bj) such that
p(ai, bj|Ai, Bj) = p(ai|Ai, Bj)p(bj|Ai, Bj).
Proof. Define the marginals p(ai|Ai, Bj) = ∑b′j p(ai, b
′
j|Ai, Bj) and p(bj|Ai, Bj) = ∑a′i p(a
′
i, bj|Ai, Bj).
Then
p(ai|Ai, Bj)p(bj|Ai, Bj) = ∑
a′i ,b
′
j
p(ai, b′j|Ai, Bj)p(a′i, bj|Ai, Bj)
= ∑
a′i ,b
′
j
δaia′i
δbjb′j
(
p(ai, bj|Ai, Bj)
)2
= p(ai, bj|Ai, Bj),
since p(ai, bj|Ai, Bj) is nonzero for a single pair ai, bj.
Theorem 23. If a set of probability distributions is deterministic and non-signalling, then it is local.
Proof. Define p(ai, bj|Ai, Bj) = ξai ,bj |Ai ,Bj(λ). Applying lemma 22 and definition 21, we have
equation (2.2), which implies locality.
Therefore, if one believes in determinism and (relativity-enforced) non-signalling, there’s
quite a good justification for the factorizability condition expressed in equation (2.2), and
therefore for Bell’s definition of locality. But we see that determinism is just a possible
justification for it, and not at all a necessary assumption for talking about locality. Without
determinism, some valid justifications for factorizability are
1. Classical theories are factorizable, as can be seen by the Gelfand-Naimark theorem [63].
After all, the motivation for looking for a ontological theory in the first place was to
recover our classical intuition in a quantum setting.
2. We don’t demand that λ gives us deterministic answers; but without factorizability then
λ does not even explain correlations. And if λ does not even explain correlations, why
bother with it?
3. A set of probability distributions admits a joint probability distribution if and only if they
are factorizable, as proven by the Fine theorem [64] (see our theorem 31):
In fact, in our opinion the best possible justification for the assumption of factorizability
is the Fine theorem, as the existence of a global probability distribution is very appealing on
physical grounds. It also shows that the assumption of factorizability implies determinism, so
there is in fact nothing else to justify.
The Fine theorem shall be our final aim when adapting this discussion to contextuality.
We start, however, from humbler considerations. First notice that definition of no-signalling
(definition 21) does not require any idle talk about relativity, if we do not require that Ai and Bj
belong to separate parties, just that they can be jointly measured (which is the only prerequisite
for talking about their joint distribution). If we rewrite it like this, we end up with a version of
Bell’s definition of contextuality for probability distributions:
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Definition 24 (Wrong). We say that a set of probability distributions is noncontextual if for every Ai
the marginal
p(ai|Ai, Aj) =∑
aj
p(ai, aj|Ai, Aj)
does not depend on Aj.
It is also fair to consider this definition to be a version of Spekkens’ definition of meas-
urement contextuality for probability distributions. But we know that this definition is not
enough for locality: if we do not also assume factorizability – or determinism – all hell breaks
loose: it becomes trivial to construct models that violate locality. In fact, notice that the trivial
ontological model discussed in section 1.2.1 – which is neither factorizable nor deterministic
– violates locality; and that by this limited definition of contextuality it would be considered
noncontextual, a truly unacceptable proposition. That is why we call these definitions wrong:
they are just a generalization of no-signalling. Certainly desirable and useful, but not the whole
story.
Following [65], we shall call this generalized no-sigalling property no-disturbance:
Definition 25 (No-disturbance). We say that a set of probability distributions respects no-disturbance
if for every Ai the marginal
p(ai|Ai, Aj) =∑
aj
p(ai, aj|Ai, Aj)
does not depend on Aj.
The full definition of noncontextuality follows from joining no-disturbance with factorizab-
ility, mirroring the definition of locality:
Definition 26 (Contextuality). A set of probability distributions p(ai, aj|Ai, Aj) is noncontextual if
there is a probability distribution µ(λ) and response functions ξai |Ai (λ) such that
p(ai, aj|Ai, Aj) =
∫
Λ
dλ µ(λ)ξai |Ai (λ)ξaj |Aj(λ).
Note that this definition is not quite revolutionary, as most works on contextuality only
considered deterministic noncontextuality. Its great value comes from the clarity it provides,
particularly on the issue of non-deterministic models: it becomes immediately obvious how to
allow for nondeterminism without trivializing our requirements, and shows that the discussion
on whether the response functions associated to effects must be deterministic is completely
irrelevant. In fact, with it we can ask whether POVMs can be useful to observe contextuality, a
question hitherto unexplored.
Furthermore, it should be clear that this definition is exactly the same as the definition
of locality, modulo the restriction that Ai and Aj are observables on separate subsystems; so
locality is just a (interesting) particular case of noncontextuality9. We shall therefore only talk
about contextuality and noncontextuality, restricting our attention to locality if interesting.
Notice also that although we only talk about pairs of jointly measurable observables, this
definition is naturally extended for sets of any (finite) size, with a corresponding extension to
multipartite locality.
9Note that even when one is only interested in tests of noncontextuality, this particular case is quite useful, since
spatial separation is a good experimental technique to ensure compatibility of the measured observables.
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To complete the discussion of contextuality, the only thing lacking is a Fine theorem for
noncontextual distributions. By now it should be obvious that it must exist, but we prefer to
stop here and establish some notation and formalize what we already have, in order to be able
to give a more precise statement. The theorem shall be proved in the next section.
2.2 The marginal problem
This notation and definitions are from [56, 58, 59], and are just a formalization of the discussion
of the previous section.
Let X = {X0, . . . , Xk−1} be a set of random variables.
Definition 27 (Marginal scenario). A marginal scenario C is a collection C = {C0, . . . , Cn−1} of
subsets Ci ⊆ X such that C′ ⊆ Ci implies C′ ∈ C.
The motivation behind this definition is to define which subsets of X can be measured
simultaneously, in order to actually measure them and generate the probability distributions
that will be tested for compatibility. We call the subsets Ci contexts, and C is the set of all
measurable contexts. Note that in quantum mechanics C will be precisely the subsets of X that
commute pairwise.
An interesting particular case is that of Bell scenarios:
Definition 28 (Bell scenario). We say that a marginal scenario C is a (bipartite) Bell scenario when
there is a partition of X into two sets A = {Ai} and B = {Bi} such that each context Ci ∈ C contains
at most one observable from A and one observable from B. The multipartite case can be defined in the
same fashion.
Note that each context will be of the form Ci = {Ak, Bl} (plus the singletons Ci = {Ak}
or Ci = {Bl}), so we can always implement this scenario in quantum mechanics via a tensor
product structure, i.e., by defining observables Ai = A˜i ⊗ 1 and Bj = 1⊗ B˜j. It then becomes
possible to consider A and B as independent, spatially separated quantum systems, and to
make the measurement of Ai and Bj with a space-like separation. In this way, each choice of
context can be justified by an assumption of causality. A natural example of a Bell scenario is
the CHSH scenario10, where
CCHSH = {{A0}, {A1}, {B0}, {B1}, {A0, B0}, {A0, B1}, {A1, B0}, {A1, B1}}.
This definition is only interesting because there are marginal scenarios where one cannot justify
the choice of context by arguing that they are measurements on independent subsystems. This
scenario is useful for proofs of contextuality, not nonlocality. An interesting example of it is the
Klyachko scenario11, where
CK = {{A0}, {A1}, {A2}, {A3}, {A4},
{A0, A1}, {A1, A2}, {A2, A3}, {A3, A4}, {A4, A0}}.
There is still a third interesting case, a partial Bell scenario, where it is still natural to define
two subsystems, but we can’t justify all the contexts by an assumption of causality, only some.
A trivial example of such a scenario would be joining CK with an observable B0 that can be
10Which shall be discussed in section 2.5.2.
11Which shall be discussed in section 2.5.3.
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in every context of CK. A more interesting example would joining CK with a copy of itself C ′K,
where we assume that every observable in the first scenario can be in a context with every
observable in the second scenario. In this case, we can have violations of both noncontextuality
and locality, with some violations of noncontextuality not implying a violation of locality. But
we are getting ahead of ourselves; to properly define what we mean by a violation we need a
method of assigning probabilities to marginal scenarios and a definition of noncontextuality
and locality within this formalism.
Definition 29 (Marginal model12). A marginal model Cp of a marginal scenario C is an assignment
of probability distributions Ci 7→ p(ci|Ci) such that13
Ci ⊆ Cj ⇒ ∑
cj\ci
p(cj|Cj) = p(ci|Ci)
That is, for every context Ci we assign a probability distribution p(ci|Ci), where ci is a
vector of possible answers to the random variables contained within Ci. Note that this rather
minimal compatibility condition on the marginals of the probability distributions is just the
no-disturbance condition (definition 25). We chose to demand it because marginal models
that violate no-disturbance are trivially contextual, and we want to restrict our attention to the
interesting cases.
The reason for this definition is that we can assign these probability distributions to the
context in an empirical manner – for example, from quantum mechanical measurements –
opening up the possibility of a experimental test of locality and noncontextuality.
With the definition of a marginal model, it becomes possible to state the definition of
contextuality within this formalism:
Definition 30 (Contextuality). A marginal model is noncontextual if there are response functions
ξxi |Xi (λ) and a probability distribution µ(λ) such that for every Ci ∈ C
p(ci|Ci) =
∫
Λ
dλ µ(λ) ∏
xn∈ ci
ξxn |Xn(λ)
Naturally, we say that a marginal model is contextual if it is not noncontextual. Note that
the definition of locality is the same, with the restriction that the marginal scenario is actually a
Bell scenario; analogously, we say that a marginal model is nonlocal if it is not local.
Having definition 30, we can state and prove the generalized Fine theorem that motivates
it1415:
Theorem 31 (Fine [56, 64, 68]). A marginal model C is noncontextual iff there exists a probability
distribution p(x|X ) such that for every Ci ∈ C
p(ci|Ci) = ∑
x\ci
p(x|X )
Proof.
12Alternative names for marginal models are behaviour [66] and box [67].
13With a slight abuse of notation.
14It was first considered by Liang et al. [68] and proved by Abramsky et al. [56].
15In fact, the motivation is so strong that some prefer to consider definition 30 as defining “objective reality” instead
of noncontextuality [57]. Although we agree that this interpretation is not inappropriate, we prefer to avoid such
dramatic terms.
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⇒ By noncontextuality, there are response functions ξxi |Xi (λ) and a probability distribution
µ(λ) such that for every Ci ∈ C
p(ci|Ci) =
∫
Λ
dλ µ(λ) ∏
xn∈ ci
ξxn |Xn(λ).
Define
p(x|X ) =
∫
Λ
dλ µ(λ) ∏
xn∈ x
ξxn |Xn(λ)
Then any marginal p(ci|Ci) is given by
p(ci|Ci) = ∑
x\ci
p(x|X )
=
∫
Λ
dλ µ(λ) ∑
x\ci
∏
xn∈ x
ξxn |Xn(λ)
=
∫
Λ
dλ µ(λ) ∏
xn∈ ci
ξxn |Xn(λ)
⇐ Every probability distribution p(x|X ) can be written as a convex combination of determin-
istic points, so let
p(x|X ) =
∫
Λ
dλ µ(λ)ξx|X (λ).
Since deterministic probability distributions are factorizable (lemma 22), we can write
p(x|X ) =
∫
Λ
dλ µ(λ) ∏
xn∈X
ξxn |Xn(λ).
By assumption, p(ci|Ci) = ∑x\ci p(x|X ), so
p(ci|Ci) =
∫
Λ
dλ µ(λ) ∑
x\ci
∏
xn∈X
ξxn |Xn(λ)
=
∫
Λ
dλ µ(λ) ∏
xn∈ ci
ξxn |Xn(λ).
Note that in the proof of the Fine theorem we can choose the response functions ξxn |Xn(λ)
to be always deterministic, so
Corollary 32. A marginal model is noncontextual if and only if there are deterministic response
functions ξxi |Xi (λ) and a probability distribution µ(λ) such that for every Ci ∈ C
p(ci|Ci) =
∫
Λ
dλ µ(λ) ∏
xn∈ ci
ξxn |Xn(λ)
This corollary can be viewed as an alternative (equivalent) definition of noncontextuality.
Now, we can finally state the problem of separating between classical and quantum:
Problem 1 (Marginal problem). How to decide whether a given marginal model is noncontextual or
contextual?
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This formulation of the problem makes its mathematical treatment much easier, since
there is extensive literature (and software) on solving the marginal problem. But perhaps its
greatest contribution is ending the debate on whether contextuality can or not be observed
in a laboratory: one measures a marginal model, and then it is just a mathematical question
whether it is contextual or not. The “finite-precision” [32, 69] loophole is just not relevant in
this formulation, as the set of contextual marginal models has non-empty interior.
2.3 A first example
If we only have two random variables, there’s nothing interesting to be done, since either we
already have the global distribution, or we can generate it simply by defining16 p(x0, x1|X0, X1) =
p(x0|X0)p(x1|X1), so the simplest nontrivial scenario must contain at least three random vari-
ables. In fact, there is a nice little example of it, taken from [68], which took it from Specker’s
parable of the over-protective seer, that can be found in [35, 36]. In it, we have three bin-
ary random variables X0, X1, and X2 that are measured pairwise, and found to be always
anti-correlated. Formalizing it, the marginal scenario is
OS = {{X0}, {X1}, {X2}, {X0, X1}, {X1, X2}, {X2, X0}},
and its marginal model OS p is (with a slight abuse of notation)
OS p = (p(x0|X0), p(x1|X1), p(x2|X2),
p(x0, x1|X0, X1), p(x1, x2|X1, X2), p(x2, x0|X2, X0)), (2.3)
which for convenience we arrange in the following tables:
X0 X1 X2
p(+) 12
1
2
1
2
p(−) 12 12 12
X0, X1 X1, X2 X2, X0
p(+,+) 0 0 0
p(+,−) 12 12 12
p(−,+) 12 12 12
p(−,−) 0 0 0
To see that this marginal model is contextual, we shall use the Fine theorem (theorem 31),
as in [68], by showing that there can be no global probability distribution p(x|X) with these
marginals.
Theorem 33. The marginal model OS p is contextual.
Proof. p(+,+|X0, X1) = 0 implies that both p(+,+,+|X0, X1, X2) and
p(+,+,−|X0, X1, X2) must be zero. Proceeding in this way with the other marginals, we can
show that all p(x0, x1, x2|X0, X1, X2) are zero, an absurd. So there is no global probability
distribution and by theorem 31 OS p is contextual.
16A moment’s thought will convince you that if the marginal scenario contains only the singletons Xn, we can
always do this and prove that it is noncontextual.
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An interesting question is then whether this contextual marginal model can be used as a
proof of contextuality for quantum mechanics. Unfortunately this is not the case, as it requires
all three products of observables XiXj to be measurable; in quantum mechanics this means
that they must commute, and therefore the observable X0X1X2 must be measurable, giving
rise to the joint probability distribution that must not exist. A marginal scenario with three
random variables that averts this problem is
V = {{X0}, {X1}, {X2}, {X0, X1}, {X1, X2}},
since it is perfectly possible that X1 commutes with both X0 and X2, but X0 and X2 does not
commute. But this marginal scenario is even more trivial than the previous one, since there is
always a noncontextual marginal model for it17. As these two are the only nontrivial marginal
scenario with three random variables, we must have at least four random variables if we want
a contextual marginal model realizable within quantum mechanics, and in fact there exists
one. To be able to explore it, though, we need a bit more structure, since a direct proof of
contextuality à la theorem 33 can be done only for the simplest cases. In the next section, we
shall develop a general algorithm to decide whether a given marginal model is contextual or
not.
2.4 Boole inequalities
When satisfied they indicate that the
data may have, when not satisfied they
indicate that the data cannot have,
resulted from actual observation
George Boole [60]
To be able to solve problem 1, we shall first take a step back and examine its geometry. We
shall see that the sets of marginal models are convex polytopes, and these can be described
by a finite set of linear inequalities, and so the question of whether a given marginal model
is contextual or not is reduced to checking if it satisfies all the inequalities for its marginal
scenario. This can be done efficiently, but with two caveats: obtaining the inequalities for
a given scenario is a difficult problem (albeit one that can be done by software), and the
number of inequalities for a marginal scenario may increase exponentially with the number of
contexts18.
In this section we shall need a number of basic results in convex geometry, which we
shall make no attempt to prove. Instead, we refer the interested reader to the excellent book
“Lectures on Polytopes” [70].
2.4.1 Sets of marginal models
There are for now two sets of marginal models that interests us: the set of all marginal models,
and the set of noncontextual marginal models. We shall see that both are convex polytopes.
Definition 34 (Convex polytope). A convex polytope is a bounded intersection of closed halfspaces.
17Since we can just define p(x0, x1, x2|X0, X1, X2) = p(x0, x1|X0, X1)p(x1, x2|X1, X2)/p(x1|X1).
18As in the example of section 2.5.
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Theorem 35. The set of all marginal models for a given marginal scenario is a convex polytope.
Proof. Consider the marginal scenario
C = {C1, . . . , CN},
and a marginal model
Cp = (p(c1|C1), . . . , p(cN |CN)).
The fact that each p(ci|Ci) is a probability distribution is encoded by the linear inequalities19
p(ci|Ci) ≥ 0 and ∑ci p(ci|Ci) = 1, and the fact that this set of probability distributions is a
marginal model is encoded by the no-disturbance condition expressed in the definition 25,
which is just another set of linear inequalities. It remains to show that the set is bounded, but
this follows from the fact that each element of Cp belongs to [0, 1].
We shall call the set of all marginal models the no-disturbance polytope.
To see that the set of noncontextual marginal models is also a convex polytope, it is easier
to use another equivalent20 definition of convex polytopes:
Definition 36 (Convex polytope). A convex polytope is the convex hull of a finite set of points in
some Rn.
Theorem 37. The set of all noncontextual marginal models for a given marginal is a convex polytope.
Proof. Consider the marginal scenario
C = {C1, . . . , CN},
and a marginal model
Cp = (p(c1|C1), . . . , p(cN |CN)).
By the corollary 32 of the Fine theorem 31, there is a probability distribution µ(λ) and
deterministic response functions ξxn |Xn(λ) such that
p(ci|Ci) =
∫
Λ
dλ µ(λ) ∏
xn∈ ci
ξxn |Xn(λ),
and so
Cp =
∫
Λ
dλ µ(λ)
(
∏
xn∈ c1
ξxn |Xn(λ), . . . , ∏
xn∈ cN
ξxn |Xn(λ)
)
,
that is, Cp is a convex combination of the points(
∏
xn∈ c1
ξxn |Xn(λ), . . . , ∏
xn∈ cN
ξxn |Xn(λ)
)
.
Since the response functions are deterministic and we are dealing with a finite number of
dichotomic random variables, the number of different points is finite, and so a marginal model
is the convex combination of a finite number of points.
19Remember that the equality x = k is just the combination of the inequalities x ≤ k and x ≥ k.
20The proof of their equivalence is the famous Minkowski-Weyl theorem.
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Analogously, the set of all noncontextual marginal models shall be called the noncontextual
polytope.
As a consequence of this proof, we see that the vertices of the noncontextual polytope are
simply the deterministic probability distributions for the outcomes of each context, and as such
they are trivial to find. What we want to do, then, is from this list of vertices obtain the linear
inequalities that describe the noncontextual polytopes. This is a classical problem in convex
geometry, and there are plenty of algorithms and software for solving it. Here we shall use the
reverse search algorithm, due to Avis and Fukuda [71], as implemented in the software lrs
[72]. Following Itamar Pitowsky, we call these Boole inequalities.
Before exploring them, we need a refinement in our representation of marginal models.
2.4.2 Representing marginal models
When writing down a marginal model, such as (2.3), one immediately notices that it has a lot of
redundancies. First of all, the joint probability distributions of a context completely determines
its marginals, since a marginal model respects no-disturbance by definition. Furthermore,
for each context there is one parameter that is already determined by normalization, and
finally each random variable is usually shared by two or more contexts, so the joint probability
distributions of different contexts are not independent, as they might share some marginals.
All these reasons motivates us to find another representation of a marginal model, that
already incorporates normalization and no-disturbance. When using only dichotomic random
variables (as we shall do in this thesis), the best representation is via the expectation value of
each context, as they contain all the information of a marginal model with no redundancies.
Theorem 38. For dichotomic random variables, a marginal model can be represented by the expectation
values of all contexts with no redundancies.
Proof. To check that, it is enough to see that all the information present on the marginal model
is preserved when it is translated into expected values, i.e., there is a (linear) invertible trans-
formation between a marginal model and a vector of all the allowed expected values. Consider,
for instance, the joint probability distribution for the context {X0, X1}. The transformation is
1 1 1 1
1 −1 1 −1
1 1 −1 −1
1 −1 −1 1


p(+,+|X0, X1)
p(+,−|X0, X1)
p(−,+|X0, X1)
p(−,−|X0, X1)
 =

1
〈X1〉
〈X0〉
〈X0X1〉
, (2.4)
and inversibility comes from the fact that the matrix is proportional to its inverse.
The proof for contexts with more than two random variables comes from noticing that
the matrix which does the linear transformation is a Hadamard matrix21. Specifically, the
transformation for n random variables can be recursively defined as follows: Let
H1 =
(
1 1
1 −1
)
,
and define Hn = H1 ⊗ Hn−1. Then it is easy to check that Hn is always self-adjoint and
H2n = 2n1. Furthermore, if the vector of probabilities is ordered in the obvious binary way,
the vector of expected values will have a corresponding order, i.e., its kth element will be〈
Xa00 X
a1
1 . . . X
an−1
n−1
〉
, where a0a1 . . . an−1 is the binary expansion of k.
21Thanks to Daniel Jonathan for pointing this out.
CHAPTER 2. REVEALING SURREALISM 48
As this representation already assumes normalization and no-disturbance, the only inform-
ation that it lacks is positivity. Since positivity does not reduce the number of dimensions, it is
not possible to find a representation that already assumes it. Instead, one enforces it via the
inequalities
4p(+,+|X0, X1) = 1+ 〈X0〉+ 〈X1〉+ 〈X0X1〉 ≥ 0 (2.5a)
4p(−,+|X0, X1) = 1− 〈X0〉+ 〈X1〉 − 〈X0X1〉 ≥ 0 (2.5b)
4p(+,−|X0, X1) = 1+ 〈X0〉 − 〈X1〉 − 〈X0X1〉 ≥ 0 (2.5c)
4p(−,−|X0, X1) = 1− 〈X0〉 − 〈X1〉+ 〈X0X1〉 ≥ 0 (2.5d)
which are obtained by inverting transformation (2.4).
Using this representation also gives us some notational convenience: since we have one
expected value for each context, we can define a marginal model simply by assigning one
expected value for each context in a marginal scenario. For example, the marginal model for
the marginal scenario
OS = {{X0}, {X1}, {X2}, {X0, X1}, {X1, X2}, {X2, X0}},
originally written as (2.3), shall be
OS p = (〈X0〉, 〈X1〉, 〈X2〉, 〈X0X1〉, 〈X1X2〉, 〈X2X0〉), (2.6)
which is easily calculated as
OS p = (0, 0, 0,−1,−1,−1). (2.7)
Another advantage of this representation is that we can easily see which statistics that indicate
correlations between random variables, such as
〈
XiXj
〉
, and which only talk about individual
systems, such as 〈Xi〉. We shall see that it is quite common to study inequalities that only
take into account correlations between random variables22: these are called full-correlation
inequalities. When talking about contexts with more than two random variables, this name is
applied only to inequalities that take into account the largest possible contexts.
2.4.3 The noncontextual polytope for OS
Now that we have a good representation, we can discuss the first example of Boole inequalities.
We shall obtain them for the marginal scenario OS . The first thing we need are the vertices
of the noncontextual polytope, which are simply the 23 deterministic assignments ±1 to each
random variable 〈Xi〉. Written in the ordering given by equation (2.6), they are
(+,+,+,+,+,+) (−,+,+,−,+,−)
(+,+,−,+,−,−) (−,+,−,−,−,+)
(+,−,+,−,−,+) (−,−,+,+,−,−)
(+,−,−,−,+,−) (−,−,−,+,+,+)
where for clarity we have omitted the ones. Inputting these vertices into lrs23, it returns 16
inequalities to us: 12 are the positivity conditions (2.5) for each pair of random variables, and 4
22In fact, only these shall be studied in this thesis.
23For those that do not like this kind of proof, we shall obtain these same inequalities in the next section via a parity
argument.
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Figure 2.1: Full correlations parts of the noncontextual polytope – green tetrahedron – and
no-disturbance polytope – black cube – for the marginal scenario OS . Note that this is a
projection onto the last three components.
are the Boole inequalities
−〈X0X1〉 − 〈X1X2〉 − 〈X2X0〉 ≤ 1 (2.8a)
−〈X0X1〉+ 〈X1X2〉+ 〈X2X0〉 ≤ 1 (2.8b)
+〈X0X1〉 − 〈X1X2〉+ 〈X2X0〉 ≤ 1 (2.8c)
+〈X0X1〉+ 〈X1X2〉 − 〈X2X0〉 ≤ 1 (2.8d)
The marginal model OS p, equation (2.7), is then easily seen to violate inequality (2.8a), being
thereby contextual.
Exactly these same inequalities were obtained by Pitowsky using Boole’s method [60, 73].
2.5 The n-cycle
As we have discussed before, it is not possible to violate the Boole inequalities for the marginal
scenario OS with quantum mechanics. However, there is a natural generalization of this
scenario which does have a quantum violation. Consider the set of random variables X =
{X0, . . . , Xn−1}, and the marginal model Cn formed by considering the singletons Xi together
with the pairs {Xi, Xi+1}, where naturally the addition is taken modulo n. For n = 3, Cn is the
marginal scenario OS discussed before. For general n this scenario is called the n-cycle, as its
compatibility24 graph is a n-cycle, as shown in figure 2.2.
24The graph that has random variables as vertices and edges connect random variables that are in the same context.
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Figure 2.2: Contexts for the 3-cycle, 4-cycle, and 5-cycle.
The n-cycle marginal scenario is an old problem that was studied many times. The 3-cycle25
was characterized by George Boole in 1862 [60, 73], who also provided the general algorithm
for solving the marginal problem. The 3-cycle was only studied again almost a hundred years
later, by Ernst Specker in 1960 [35, 36], and then by Itamar Pitowsky in 1989 [74]. The 4-cycle
was characterized by Arthur Fine in 1982 [64]. The 5-cycle was characterized by Alexander
Klyachko in 2002 [52]. The n-cycle for all odd n was studied by Yeong-Cherng Liang, Robert
Spekkens, and Howard Wiseman in 2010 [68], and also by Adán Cabello, Simone Severini, and
Andreas Winter in the same year [54]. The general n-cycle was studied by Rafael Chaves and
Tobias Fritz in 2012, who derived entropic inequalities which are necessary but not sufficient
for noncontextuality for all n [58, 59]. An answer to the general question was conjectured by
Cabello et al. in 2012 [43]. It will be given here26.
The Boole inequalities for this scenario can be derived from the simple algebraic observation
that if αi = ±1 are the components of a n-element vector, then the vector β with n components
βi = αiαi+1 always has an even number of negative components. Therefore, if we define a third
vector γ with an odd number of negative components, then
〈γ, β〉 ≤ n− 2, (2.9)
since to maximize the inner product we should set β = γ, but this would force β to have an
odd number of negative components, which is impossible. The best we can do then is to switch
one of the −1 to +1, which gives us the desired bound.
If we now set 〈Xi〉 = αi, then βi = 〈XiXi+1〉 is the full-correlation part of the vertices of
the noncontextual polytope for this marginal scenario, and inequality (2.9) becomes the Boole
inequality
Bn =
n−1
∑
i=0
γi〈XiXi+1〉 ≤ n− 2. (2.10)
Since these are satisfied by noncontextual vertices, they are also satisfied by the convex
combinations of them, and so every noncontextual marginal model respects these inequalities.
We claim that these 2n−1 inequalities are all the Boole inequalities for the n-cycle. To prove this,
we shall check that these inequalities are actually facets of the noncontextual polytope, and
that there are no more Boole inequalities for the n-cycle.
25As we discussed before, in this case the noncontextual polytope coincides with the no-disturbance polytope, and
therefore its facets are only the positivity conditions (2.5).
26The results of this and the next section are new [75].
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Theorem 39. All inequalities (2.10) are facets of the noncontextual polytope for the n-cycle.
Proof. We will check that each Boole inequality (2.10) is saturated by 2n affinely independent
vertices of the noncontextual polytope, that generate an affine subspace of dimension 2n− 1.
Note that if we flip the sign of any component γi of the Boole inequality γ, then this new
vector γ′ satisfies 〈γ,γ′〉 = n− 2 and has an even number of negative components, so we have
obtained the full-correlation part of a noncontextual vertex that saturates the Boole inequalities.
Since there are two ways of completing the local part of a noncontextual vertex that are
consistent with a given full-correlation part and we have n components γi to flip the sign,
in this manner we obtain 2n vertices of the noncontextual polytope that saturate the Boole
inequality γ. To check that they are affinely independent is trivial.
To check that there are no more Boole inequalities, we need first to characterize the
contextual vertices of the no-disturbance polytope.
Theorem 40. The vertices of the no-disturbance polytope are the 2n noncontextual deterministic
marginal models
(〈X0〉, . . . , 〈Xn−1〉, 〈X0〉〈X1〉, . . . , 〈Xn−1〉〈X0〉), (2.11)
where 〈Xi〉 = ±1, together with the 2n−1 contextual marginal models of the form
(0, . . . , 0, 〈X0X1〉, . . . , 〈Xn−1X0〉), (2.12)
where 〈XiXi+1〉 = ±1 such that number of negative components is odd.
Proof. By definition, the vertices of the polytope are given by the intersection of 2n independent
hyperplanes, i.e., as a unique solution for a set of 2n independent linear equations chosen
among the 4n equations (2.5). The above vertices are obtained by choosing two equations
among (2.5a)-(2.5d), for each index i. In particular, contextual vertices are obtained by choosing
equations (2.5a) and (2.5d) for an odd number of indexes i and equations (2.5b) and (2.5c) for
the remaining indexes.
It is straightforward to check that all other possible strategies for obtaining a vertex, i.e.,
involving the choice of 1, 2 or 3 equations for each index i, give the same set of vertices.
We now show that by eliminating each contextual vertex of the no-disturbance polytope we
obtain only one noncontextuality inequality. By eliminating all 2n−1 contextual vertices, we
obtain 2n−1 noncontextuality inequalities and the convex hull of all noncontextual vertices, i.e.,
the noncontextual polytope.
Lemma 41. Let C be a contextual vertex, and consider the inequality (2.9) with γ = C. Then the
intersection of the half-space 〈γ, P〉 ≤ n− 2 with the no-disturbance polytope is the convex hull of all
vertices but C.
Proof. To show that, we shall check that the vertices of the intersection of the half-space 〈γ, P〉 ≤
n − 2 with the no-disturbance polytope are a subset of the vertices of the no-disturbance
polytope. For contradiction, suppose that the intersection generates a new vertex P′ that was
not a vertex of the no-disturbance polytope. Then 〈γ, P′〉 = n− 2 and, furthermore, P′ must
lie on an edge connected to C, since all the other vertices respect the inequality. Edges of
the no-disturbance polytope must saturate 2n− 1 independent positivity conditions (2.5), and
therefore P′ must saturate 2n− 1 inequalities which are a subset of the 2n inequalities saturated
by the vertex C.
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Let β be the full-correlation part of C, and δ the full-correlation part of P′. For each i, if
βi = +1, then C saturates (2.5b) and (2.5c). If βi = −1, C saturates (2.5a) and (2.5d). Therefore,
for every i but one, let’s say, i0, P′ must saturate both positivity conditions; but saturating them
both implies that δi = βi, leaving only δi0 free. But if we now demand that 〈γ, P′〉 = n− 2, then
δi0 = −βi0 , and therefore P′ is just an old noncontextual vertex.
To summarize our results: the no-disturbance polytope has 2n + 2n−1 vertices, of which 2n
are noncontextual and 2n−1 are contextual. It has 4n facets, which are the positivity conditions
(2.5). The noncontextual polytope has 2n vertices and 4n + 2n−1 facets.
2.5.1 Quantum violations
The Boole inequalities for the n-cycle are violated by quantum mechanics for every n ≥ 4.
Since the inequalities for a given n are all equivalent via relabellings, it is enough to violate
one of them. For odd n, we choose the inequality with all γi = −1. The minimal dimension
we need to violate the Boole inequalities is 3, the state is always |0〉, and the observables27 are
Ak = 2|vk〉〈vk| − 1, where
|vk〉 = (cos θ, sin θ cos φk, sin θ sin φk),
where
φk =
n− 1
n
pik
and
cos2 θ =
cos pin
1+ cos pin
.
Then 〈0|Ak Ak+1|0〉 = −4|〈0|vk〉|2 + 1 = −4 cos2 θ + 1, and
Bn = n
(
4
cos pin
1+ cos pin
− 1
)
. (2.13)
The noncontextual bound is Bn ≤ n− 2. This inequality is saturated for n = 3, and violated
for all n ≥ 5. To see this, it is enough to use some simple algebra and the fact that
cos
pi
n
> 1− pi
2
n2
for all n.
For even n, we choose the inequality for which all γi = −1 except for γn−1 = +1. Dimension
4 is enough to violate28 it for all n, with the state
|ψ−〉 = |01〉 − |10〉,
and the observables29 Xk = X˜k ⊗ 1 for even k and Xk = 1⊗ X˜k for odd k, where
X˜k = cos
kpi
n
σx + sin
kpi
n
σz,
27These states and observables are from [68].
28We conjecture that this is in fact the minimal dimension. For n = 4 the proof is well-known.
29These states and observables are from [76].
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and σx, σz are the Pauli matrices.
We can then check that
XkXk+1|ψ−〉 = − cos pin |ψ−〉 − sin
pi
n
|φ+〉
for every k except k = n− 1, when
Xn−1X0|ψ−〉 = cos pin |ψ−〉 − sin
pi
n
|φ+〉.
Therefore,
Bn = n cos pin , (2.14)
so the noncontextual bound is saturated for n = 2, and violated for all n ≥ 4.
Note that in both the even and odd cases limn→∞ Bn = n, the algebraic bound.
2.5.2 The CHSH inequality
The 4-cycle is actually a Bell scenario, since every observable in the set {X0, X2} commutes with
every observable in the set {X1, X3}. Renaming A0 = X0, A1 = X2, B0 = X1, and B1 = X3, we
have the famous CHSH inequality [77].
〈A0B0〉+ 〈A0B1〉+ 〈A1B0〉 − 〈A0B1〉 ≤ 2 (2.15)
The maximal quantum violation for it – its Tsirelson bound [78] – is 2
√
2. This inequality was
used in countless experimental tests of nonlocality, of which the most famous are the first, by
Freedman and Clauser [20], and Aspect’s [79].
2.5.3 The Klyachko inequality
The 5-cycle was studied before by Klyachko [52], and the following inequality got his name:
− 〈X0X1〉 − 〈X1X2〉 − 〈X2X3〉 − 〈X3X4〉 − 〈X4X0〉 ≤ 3. (2.16)
Its Tsirelson bound is 4
√
5 − 5. It is the simplest Boole inequality that is not also a Bell
inequality that can be violated by quantum mechanics. It was also the first such inequality to be
discovered30. Since this inequality can violated by qutrits, and only requires the measurement of
5 observables, it allows one of simplest possible tests of noncontextuality. Such an experimental
test has in fact been carried out [80].
2.6 Tsirelson bounds for Boole inequalities
In this section we consider the problem of calculating Tsirelson bounds for generic Boole
inequalities. In general, this is extremely difficult to do. The best known algorithm for solving
it involves an infinite hierarchy of semidefinite programs [81–83], with each step providing a
tighter upper bound to the Tsirelson bound. This algorithm, however, does not terminate, since
it can never confirm that a given upper bound is in fact equal to the Tsirelson bound. For this
and other reasons, Tsirelson bounds are conjectured to be in general uncomputable [83–85] (to
the best of my knowledge, this was first conjectured by Tobias Fritz).
30Pitowsky found the inequalities for the 3-cycle in 1989 [74], but they can not be violated by quantum mechanics.
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But since the computation of each step of the hierarchy is a semidefinite program, it can be
done efficiently, and in practice good upper bounds can be obtained with little effort. Here we
present a simple technique to find an upper bound, due to Cabello, Severini, and Winter [54],
that is closely related to the first step of the hierarchy [83].
To study the quantum value of a Boole inequality B it is more convenient to represent it
as an operator; i.e., we define Bˆ to be the operator such that B = 〈Bˆ〉
ρ
. For example, for the
n-cycle inequalities
Bn =
n−1
∑
i=0
γi〈XiXi+1〉 ≤ n− 2,
the operator is
Bˆn =
n−1
∑
i=0
γiXiXi+1
Then we define the Tsirelson bound ΩQ of a Boole inequality B from some marginal scenario C
as
ΩQ = max
ρ,Bˆ
tr ρBˆ = max
Bˆ
∥∥Bˆ∥∥, (2.17)
where31 the maximization is done over all quantum realizations Bˆ of the marginal scenario
C, i.e., over all operators Xi which respect the commutation relations implied by the marginal
scenario. Note that the Tsirelson bound is always reached with pure states.
The problem is that doing this maximization is a terribly difficult job, as the set of quantum
realizations of a marginal scenario is anything but simple. It is possible, however, to do the
maximization over a larger set, and thus obtain an upper bound on ΩQ. To show how to do
this, we need a little detour through graph theory.
2.6.1 A graph-theoretical detour
To be more precise, we are going to show that every quantum realization of a marginal scenario
is also an orthonormal representation of a certain graph, and that the maximization over these
orthonormal representations can be done efficiently.
This graph is called the exclusivity graph of a given Boole inequality. Please do not confound
it with the compatibility graph32 that was introduced in the previous section; the compatibility
graph encodes the marginal scenario. The exclusivity graph, on the other hand, encodes a
specific representation of a Boole inequality.
To define it, we first need to rewrite the desired Boole inequality as the conical sum
Σ =∑
ci
ωi p(ci|Ci), (2.18)
that is, as a sum of probabilities with positive coefficients33. This can always be done, since
we can always eliminate negative signs through normalization of probabilities, i.e., using the
fact that −p(A = a) = p(A 6= a)− 1. A useful identity for doing this with inequalities that are
originally written in terms of expectation values is
± 〈XiXj〉 = 2(p(+± |Xi, Xj) + p(−∓ |Xi, Xj))− 1. (2.19)
31‖·‖ is the standard operator norm.
32Actually, in the general case it is the compatibility hypergraph: it is only a graph when the maximum number of
observables in a context is two.
33It can be proven that these coefficients are always rational.
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It is easy to see that this representation is not unique, because the representation of the Boole
inequalities themselves is not unique: there is freedom in using no-disturbance conditions
(or no-signalling) and normalization. For example, the inequality (2.8a) for the 3-cycle can be
represented as
p(+− |01) + p(−+ |01) + p(+− |12) + p(−+ |12)
+ p(+− |20) + p(−+ |20) ≤ 2, (2.20)
which can be further simplified through no-disturbance conditions to
p(+− |01) + p(+− |12) + p(+− |20) ≤ 1.
For clarity, we are omitting the Xs from these inequalities. In general, different representations
will give you different upper bounds for the Tsirelson bound34, and it is a bit of an art to find
the best representation [86].
Now, we’re ready to define the exclusivity graph:
Definition 42. The exclusivity graph of a Boole inequality written in the form (2.18) is a graph that
has the events ci|Ci as vertices, with edges connecting exclusive events.
In the general case, we need to consider the exclusivity graph together with an assignment
positive numbers ωi to its vertices. It is often the case that ωi = 1, and then we don’t need to
talk about this.
For example, the vertex +− |01 from inequality (2.20) will be connected to the vertices
+− |12, −+ |01, and +− |20. Its exclusivity graph is the prism graph represented in figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Exclusivity graph for the 3-cycle.
Now we’re ready to define what is an orthonormal representation35 of a graph:
34Although this is not the case with this example.
35Unfortunately, our definition is the opposite of what is found in the graph theory literature [87, 88]: what they
call an orthonormal representation of a graph G is equivalent to our definition of an orthonormal representation of the
complement graph G¯.
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Definition 43. An orthonormal representation of a graph G with vertices Vi is an assignment of
projectors Γi such that Vi adjacent to Vj implies that ΓiΓj = 0.
Now we can show that any quantum realization of a marginal scenario gives rise to an
orthonormal representation of the exclusivity graph. The idea is quite simple: in quantum
mechanics, to obtain the probability p(ci|Ci) one calculates tr ρΠci |Ci ; then if we define Γi =
Πci |Ci , this is a valid orthonormal representation, as projectors associated to exclusive events
are orthogonal.
For example, in figure 2.3 the vertices +− |01 and +− |20 are adjacent. To calculate the
probabilities we have
p(+− |01) = tr ρΠ+0 Π−1 and p(+− |20) = tr ρΠ+2 Π−0 ,
where Π+0 is the projector of the observable X0 associated with the outcome +, and so on.
Therefore, the projectors we assign to these vertices are Π+0 Π
−
1 and Π
+
2 Π
−
0 , and their product
is zero since they Π+0 Π
−
0 = 0.
The converse statement is not true: given an orthonormal representation Γi of the graph,
it is in general not possible to find a quantum realization of the associated marginal scenario
such that Πci |Ci = Γi.
An elegant counterexample can be found by considering the CHSH36 (2.15) and Klyachko
(2.16) inequalities [86]. Using normalization and no-disturbance conditions they can be written,
respectively, as
p(+−|01) + p(+−|12) + p(++|23) + p(−+|30) + p(−|0) ≤ 2 ≤ 3+
√
2
2
(2.21)
and
p(+−|01) + p(+−|12) + p(+−|23) + p(+−|34) + p(+−|40) ≤ 2 ≤
√
5, (2.22)
where the last inequalities refer to the respective Tsirelson bounds. The surprising thing about
these inequalities is that their exclusivity graph is the same, the pentagon. They are shown in
figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Exclusivity graphs for inequalities (2.21) and (2.22).
The fact that the Tsirelson bound for the Klyachko inequality (2.22) is
√
5 implies that there
is an orthonormal representation of the pentagon Γi such that ‖∑i Γi‖ =
√
5; but if there existed
36Actually, this relabelling of it: −〈X0X1〉 − 〈X1X2〉+ 〈X2X3〉 − 〈X3X0〉 ≤ 2
CHAPTER 2. REVEALING SURREALISM 57
a quantum realization Πci |Ci of the CHSH scenario such that Πci |Ci = Γi, this would imply that
it is possible to violate inequality (2.21) up to
√
5, a contradiction, since
√
5 is larger than its
Tsirelson bound of 3+
√
2
2 .
This shows that the set of orthonormal representations of an exclusivity graph is strictly
larger than the set of quantum realizations of a marginal scenario, and therefore that optimizing
over this larger set can only give us an upper bound on the Tsirelson bound of the Boole
inequality.
2.6.2 The CSW theorem
Putting all these observations together shows us that
ΩQ = max
ψ,Πci |Ci
∑
i
ωi trψΠci |Ci ≤ maxψ,Γi ∑i
ωi trψΓi = Ω′Q,
that is, the Tsirelson bound ΩQ of a Boole inequality written in the form (2.18) is upperbounded
by maximizing the value of the inequality over all orthonormal representations Γi of its
exclusivity graph G.
The significance of this observation comes from the fact that while ΩQ is in general
uncomputable, Ω′Q can be calculated in polynomial time. Furthermore,
Ω′Q = ϑ(G,ω),
that is, it is the weighted Lovász ϑ-function of the exclusivity graph [87, 88]. The proof of this
equivalence37 for ωi = 1 is theorem 5 in [87], or equation 10.1 in [88] for the general case. This
is a famous graph-theoretical function, and therefore this equivalence allows us to access the
vast literature existent about it to find Tsirelson bounds for the inequalities that interests us.
There’s one caveat: the usual definition of the Lovász function requires the Γi to be one-
dimensional projectors, and in our case this is not always true, since if we have Γi = Πci |Ci
they will have in general rank larger than one. But this poses no problem, since restricting
the maximization to be over one-dimensional projectors does not reduce the value of Ω′Q.
To see that, suppose that the maximum is reached with a higher-dimensional orthonormal
representation Γi. Then we can simply define define one-dimensional projectors
Γ′i =
ΓiψΓi
trψΓi
such that Γ′i is also an orthonormal representation of G and trψΓ
′
i = trψΓi, thereby giving the
same value of Ω′Q.
This connection of Boole inequalities with graph theory is known as the CSW theorem:
Theorem 44 (Cabello, Severini, Winter [54]). Let Σ = ∑ci ωi p(ci|Ci) be a Boole inequality, G its
exclusivity graph, and ΩQ its Tsirelson bound. Then
Σ ≤ ΩQ ≤ ϑ(G,ω) (2.23)
37Note, once more, that Lovász’s definition of an orthonormal representation of a graph G is equivalent to our
definition of an orthonormal representation of the complement graph G¯.
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2.6.3 Tsirelson bounds for the n-cycle
As an application of CSW theorem 44, we shall find the quantum bounds for the Boole inequal-
ities found in section 2.5. As these inequalities only have terms ±〈XiXj〉, the transformation
(2.19) will be enough to bring them to the form of inequality (2.18), so
Bn = 2Σn − n,
where Σn is the desired sum of probabilities. To find the exclusivity graph for odd n, the same
strategy used in figure 2.3 works, so it will be the prism graph Yn, and therefore the Tsirelson
bound is upperbounded by 2ϑ(Yn)− n. The Lovász function of the prism graph is38
ϑ(Yn) =
2n cos pin
1+ cos pin
,
thus proving that the quantum violation (2.13) is the largest possible.
To find the exclusivity graph for even n, the strategy is as represented in figure 2.5, where it
is done for n = 4. It is clear that this strategy always works, so the exclusivity graph for even n
is the Möbius ladder M2n. Its Lovász function is conjectured to be39
ϑ(M2n) =
n
2
(
1+ cos
pi
n
)
,
which would prove that the quantum violation (2.14) is in fact the largest possible. A proof can
be obtained40 from the results of [89].
Figure 2.5: CSW graph for the 4-cycle.
38As was proven in [75], and can also be derived from the results of [54, 68].
39See [75] for a discussion.
40See, again, [75] for a discussion.
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2.7 State-independent Boole inequalities
All the Boole inequalities we have studied so far have quantum violations that depend on the
quantum state: they are violated by some, but not violated by others. This situation stands
in contrast with the proofs of contextuality we studied in section 1.7: they only considered
predictions of quantum mechanics that were valid for any state. Therefore, it would be quite
surprising if we couldn’t find a Boole inequality that were violated by any quantum state.
2.7.1 A Boole inequality from the 18-projector proof by Cabello, Estebaranz, and
García-Alcaine
The 18-projector proof [40] translates quite directly into a state-independent Boole inequality
[41]. To see that, define Aij = 2vij − 1, where vij are the projectors from figure 1.2. Then if
we take the product of four commuting such Aij, it will be always equal to −1. Taking these
products over all nine sets of commuting Aij and adding them together, we get
Iˆ18 = −A12 A16 A17 A18 − A12 A23 A28 A29 − A23 A34 A37 A39
− A34 A45 A47 A48 − A45 A56 A58 A59 − A16 A56 A67 A69
− A17 A37 A47 A67 − A18 A28 A48 A58 − A29 A39 A59 A69 = 91 (2.24)
but a computer program can easily check that in any noncontextual theory
I18 = −〈A12 A16 A17 A18〉 − 〈A12 A23 A28 A29〉 − 〈A23 A34 A37 A39〉
− 〈A34 A45 A47 A48〉 − 〈A45 A56 A58 A59〉 − 〈A16 A56 A67 A69〉
− 〈A17 A37 A47 A67〉 − 〈A18 A28 A48 A58〉 − 〈A29 A39 A59 A69〉 ≤ 7. (2.25)
This Boole inequality is therefore violated by any quantum state.
2.7.2 A Boole inequality from Yu and Oh’s 13-projector proof
The projectors from Yu and Oh’s 13-projector proof can also be used to form such a state-
independent inequality [42], but their inequality is not a facet of the noncontextual polytope,
and according to our definition not a Boole inequality at all. Fortunately, there is a Boole
inequality associated to their projectors, found by Cabello et al. [43]. It reads
IYO = 2〈H0〉+
3
∑
i=1
〈Zi〉+
〈
Y+i
〉
+
〈
Y−i
〉
+ 2〈Hi〉
+
3
∑
j=1
〈
ZjY+j
〉
+
〈
Y+j Y
−
j
〉
+
〈
Y−j Zj
〉
− 3
3
∑
k=1
〈
ZkY+k Y
−
k
〉− ∑
Ci∈ C2
〈Ci〉 ≤ 25,
where Zi = 1− 2zi, Y±i = 1− 2y±i , Hi = 1− 2hi, as defined in section 1.7.2, and C2 is the subset
of two-observable contexts of Yu and Oh’s marginal scenario. The operator IˆYO = (25+ 8/3)1
is again proportional to identity, and this inequality is the one in Yu and Oh’s noncontextual
polytope with the largest violation. As this inequality was found by a computer program we
feel no need of reproducing a proof here.
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2.7.3 A Boole inequality from the Peres-Mermin square
Peres-Mermin’s proof can also be adapted into such an inequality. Let Aij be the observables
of the Peres-Mermin square as defined in equation (1.10). Then it follows that
IˆPM = A11 A12 A13 + A21 A22 A23 + A31 A32 A33
+ A11 A21 A31 + A12 A22 A32 − A13 A23 A33 = 61,
but a computer program41 can easily check that
IPM = 〈A11 A12 A13〉+ 〈A21 A22 A23〉+ 〈A31 A32 A33〉
+ 〈A11 A21 A31〉+ 〈A12 A22 A32〉 − 〈A13 A23 A33〉 ≤ 4.
This Boole inequality was also found by Adán Cabello [41].
Note that in all these inequalities the operator Iˆ was proportional to identity, but this is not
a required condition for a state-independent violation: we only need
〈Iˆ〉
ψ
to be larger than
the noncontextual bound for every ψ. It is an open question if there is a Boole inequality that
satisfies the latter condition but not the former42.
41Or in fact yourself, by some playing around with the triangle inequality.
42It is trivial, however, to generate such inequalities that are not facets of the noncontextual polytope.
Conclusion
The attentive reader might have noticed that despite hints of quantum magic as the motivation
for this thesis, there has been almost no mention of it in the technical parts of the text. In part
this is because of the limitations of time and space, but more importantly because I believe
that to really understand quantum magic, we must understand the foundations of quantum
mechanics first; and this latter understanding is still sorely lacking. The goal of this thesis was
therefore to help with this point.
This goal can be naturally split in two parts (if not in two chapters): first, to summarize
old research in a clear and consistent way, and second (and more important), to expose new
research that is not as widely known as I think it deserves to be.
Specifically, I hope to have convinced the reader that the formulation of noncontextuality
exposed in chapter 2 is a fruitful way of separating “classical” phenomena from those that
are truly quantum. The way ahead is to actually pick up those fruits: develop information
processing protocols that derive their strenght from the violation of Boole inequalities. In a
sense, this work has already begun: we know that the higher-than-classical power of quantum
random access codes comes from contextuality [90], and [68] has a very colourful description
of a game in which contextuality boosts the chance of success.
But, in my opinion, these protocols lack a deeper appeal, since it’s not clear if the fact that
they have a quantum advantage means anything other than the fact that they have a quantum
advantage. What would really please me is to find a connection between contextuality and a
discovery that has far-reaching implications in physics, mathematics, and computer science:
quantum computing.
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Appendix A
The Bell-Mermin model
This ontological model was first proposed by Bell in 1964 [4], in order to provide a counter-
example to von Neumann’s theorem [15], and later cleaned up by David Mermin [5]. It is
certainly the simplest deterministic ontological model out there, having been constructed to
describe the statistics coming from the measurement of any observable of a pure qubit. It is
not contextual, but if extended to mixed states it would have to be preparation-contextual,
by Spekkens’ theorem, and if extended to higher dimensions it would become measurement-
contextual, by Gleason’s theorem. It also can’t be extended to describe POVMs, by Busch’s
theorem. In a sense, then, it is the best that a realist commited to non-contextuality can do.
This model is quite out of fashion, as it measures observables instead of its projectors; but
we shall make no violence to it by “fixing” this feature. The concerned reader may do it himself
quite easily, or simply consult Harrigan’s work [8].
We formulate it by representing a two-dimensional self-adjoint observable A in the Bloch
basis, as
A = a01+ a · σ,
where a0 ∈ R, a ∈ R3 and σ is the vector of Pauli matrices.
The ontic space Λ = S2 × S2 is the cartesian product of two unit spheres. In the first one
we shall embed the pure states via their Bloch vector ψˆ ∈ S2, defined by ψ = 12 (1+ ψˆ · σ), and
in the second one we shall use an auxiliar unit vector λ.
The ontic state is then
µψ = δ(λψ − ψˆ),
and the response function is
ξA(λψ,λ) = a0 + ‖a‖ sign(a · (λ+ λψ)). (A.1)
Notice that given λψ and λ, it gives deterministically a0 + ‖a‖ or a0 − ‖a‖, as required.
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To recover the quantum statistics, we take the uniform average of ξA over Λ:
〈A〉 =
∫
Λ
µψξA
= a0 + ‖a‖
∫
Λ
dλψ dλ δ(λψ − ψˆ) sign(aˆ · (λ+ λψ))
= a0 + ‖a‖
∫
S2
dλ sign(aˆ · (λ+ ψˆ))
= a0 + ‖a‖ 14pi
∫ 2pi
0
∫ pi
0
sin θaλ dθaλ dϕ sign(cos θaλ + aˆ · ψˆ)
= a0 + ‖a‖12
(∫ cos−1(−aˆ·ψˆ)
0
sin θaλ dθaλ −
∫ pi
cos−1(−aˆ·ψˆ)
sin θaλ dθaλ
)
= a0 + a · ψˆ
= tr Aψ
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